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BOOK REVIEW 
CAUSE LAWYERING FOR 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT. By Samuel R. Bagenstos. New Haven & London: Yale 
Univ. Press. 2009. Pp. xii, 228. $48.00. 
Reviewed by Michael Ashley Stein,* 
Michael E. Waterstone, ** and David B. Wilkins*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Passed with great flourish, 1 the Americans with Disabilities Act2 
(ADA) was heralded as an "emancipation proclamation" for Americans 
with disabilities.3 Nevertheless, twenty years after its enactment the 
overall socioeconomic status of persons with disabilities in the United 
States is tenuous.4 In particular, notwithstanding the express require-
ment that employers provide reasonable workplace accommodations 
for qualified individuals with disabilities, nearly all empirical analyses 
conclude that the relative employment rates of disabled persons has 
not improved significantly since the statute's passage.5 Consequently, 
academics and policymakers alike continue to question the ADA's abil-
* Executive Director, Harvard Law School Project on Disability; Cabell Professor, William & 
Mary Law School. 
** Professor and Associate Dean of Academic Programs, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. 
*** Lester Kissel Professor of Law, Vice Dean for Global Initiatives on the Legal Profession and 
Director of the Program on the Legal Profession, Harvard Law School. We thank William Al-
ford, Rick Hasen, James Moliterno, and Doug NeJaime for their comments; and Cara Boekeloo, 
Laura Jacobson, and especially Jason Silverstein for research assistance. Professor Stein's re-
search was sponsored in part by a grant from Foundation Open Society (Zug). 
1 See, e.g., George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1068 Guly 26, 1990) (stating that the ADA "is the world's first comprehen-
sive declaration of equality for people with disabilities'). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). 
3 1\vo senators used this phrase. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Har-
kin); 135 CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
4 For example, the 2005 employment rate among working-age people with disabilities was 
38%, and the poverty rate among the same group was 25%. CORNELL UNIV. REHAB. RE-
SEARCH AND TRAINING CTR. ON DISABILITY DEMOGRAPHICS AND STATISTICS, DISABIL-
ITY STATUS REPORTS (2005), available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/edildisabilitystatisticsl 
StatusReports/2005-html/2o05-StatusReports_US.html. 
5 See THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (David C. Staple-
ton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003) (collecting empirical studies). 
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ity as a policy instrument to achieve true equality for Americans with 
disabilities. 6 
The results of claims brought under the statute appear to confirm 
this gloomy assessment. In 2008, lawsuits brought under Title I's em-
ployment provisions' lost before federal trial courts approximately 
g8% of the time.8 By contrast, claims under Title II of the statute re-
garding access to state and local government services9 and under Title 
III's provisions regarding access to public accommodations10 have met 
with some success. 11 This thematic divide is reflected at the Supreme 
Court, where nearly every claimant alleging disability-based employ-
ment discrimination has lost, and nearly every other plaintiff seeking 
relief under the statute has won. 
Given this track record, it is not surprising that, almost since its 
enactment, scholars have been critical of the ADA. These criticisms 
typically fall within one of three broad camps: that the statute is poor-
ly written and structurally flawed; 12 that the ADA has been betrayed 
by judicial backlash; 13 or that disability-based workplace accom-
modations are inefficient and create disincentives to employing dis-
abled persons. 14 
In Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights Movement, 
Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos moves beyond these standard critiques 
to provide a more nuanced - and for disability rights advocates, an 
ultimately more unsettling - explanation of the ADA's failure to 
6 See, e.g., ADA Notification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3590 Before the Subcomm. on the Consti-
tution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o6th Cong. 61 (2000). 
7 42 U.S.C. §§ I211I-I2117. 
8 AM. BAR ASS'N, 2008 EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER THE ADA TITLE I- SUR· 
VEY UPDATE (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/disability/docsf2oo9TitleiSurvey.pdf. 
The American Bar Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law (on which 
two of the authors served as Commissioners) has provided annual tallies since 1997. The only 
lower recorded win-loss rate in federal court is for prisoner rights cases. Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
"Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 825, 9Io--11 (2003). 
9 42 u.s.c. §§ I2I31-I2I34· 
10 I d. §§ I2 I8I-I2 I89. 
11 See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
58 VAND. L. REv. I807, I826-30 (2005) (noting that Title II and Title III claims have been more 
successful than Title I claims at the trial level). 
12 See, e.g., Charles Lane, O'Connor Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST, 
Mar. IS, 2002, at A2 (noting that the legislative sponsors were "so eager to get something passed 
that what passes hasn't been as carefully written as a group of law professors might put together') 
(quoting Justice O'Connor speaking extrajudicially). 
13 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword- Backlash Against the ADA: Interdiscipli-
nary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 2 I BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. I (2000), revised and reprinted in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DIS-
ABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003). 
14 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 48Q--94 (I992). 
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achieve its lofty goals. Bagenstos rejects the claim that Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in this area, including decisions with which he disagrees, 
is either the byproduct of judicial backlash or of inartfully crafted leg-
islation. Instead, he argues that a central reason for the ADA's limited 
success is the inherent plurality of the disability rights movement itself. 
This diversity of interests, Bagenstos claims, has created tensions 
within the movement's goals. In turn, when adjudicating the ADA, 
the Rehnquist Courtl 5 (including, at times, Justices appointed by both 
parties) selected interpretations of the scope of disability rights from 
among a competing set of principles articulated by members of this 
"large and contentious" movement (p. x). For example, strands of dis-
ability rights thinking support that Court's narrow definition of dis-
ability and its restrictions on the accommodation requirement (pp. s-
6). Given these internal tensions, Bagenstos urges disability rights ad-
vocates to move beyond the antidiscrimination paradigm that has 
largely informed their approach to the ADA. Although he supports a 
number of traditional litigation-based reforms (such as reinstating 
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees to incentivize private enforcement), Bagens-
tos argues that an alternative for advancing the interests of people 
with disabilities lies in universalist mechanisms exogenous to the stat-
ute - notably, extending public and private health care coverage. 
In highlighting the internal contradictions within the disability 
rights movement, Bagenstos has made a unique and important contri-
bution to our understanding of what has happened to the ADA, par-
ticularly with respect to its fate in the Supreme Court. But by calling 
attention to these tensions, Bagenstos implicitly raises an even more 
fundamental question: given that internal divisions have undermined 
the movement's goals, why have disability rights advocates failed to 
develop strategies for bridging - or at the very least, camouflaging -
their differences in order to present a more effective, united front? 
As recent scholarship makes clear, the disability rights movement is 
far from unique in harboring significant internal contradictions within 
its ranks. Although prior struggles on behalf of other groups such as 
blacks or women are often portrayed as unproblematic expressions of 
the universal yearnings of oppressed people to be free, we now know 
that this hagiography often glosses over deep internal tensions that 
frequently threatened to derail these campaigns. 16 Yet notwithstand-
15 The one ADA case the Roberts Court has had occasion to consider is United States v. Geor-
gia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). This unanimous decision did not break significant ground in terms of 
ADA jurisprudence, essentially reiterating - though declining to expand or narrow - the Rehn-
quist Court's decision two years earlier in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). We therefore 
focus our discussion on the Rehnquist Court. 
16 Compare, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975), and 
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ing these deep divisions, advocates for the rights of blacks, women, 
and, most recently, gays and lesbians have been able to achieve sub-
stantial victories in the Supreme Court. Disability rights advocates, as 
Bagenstos ably demonstrates, have not been able to achieve similar 
success. 
In this Review, we suggest one possible explanation for this differ-
ence: the almost complete absence of disability rights "cause lawyers" 
in the ADA cases that have gone to the Supreme Court. 17 By "cause 
lawyers" we mean attorneys who spend a significant amount of their 
professional time designing and bringing cases that seek to benefit var-
ious categories of people with disabilities and who have formal connec-
tions with disability rights organizations.18 Over the first two decades 
of the ADA, the Supreme Court heard eighteen related cases. 19 None 
GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUG· 
GLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983), with TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: AT-
LANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (forthcoming Nov. 
2010), and Kenneth Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before 
Brown, r IS YALE L.]. 2S6 (2oos). 
17 We note, as well, the absence of disability rights cause lawyers from the general cause law-
yering literature. See CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & 
Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., I998) [hereinafter PO-
LITICAL COMMITMENTS]; CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & 
Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO 
BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004); THE WORLDS 
CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin Sarat & 
Stuart Scheingold eds., 200S) [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND AGENCY]; see also THE CULTURAL 
LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2008). In this collection, 
there is only one contribution on cause lawyering for the disabled: Neta Ziv, Cause Lawyers, 
Clients, and the State: Congress as a Forum for Cause Lawyering During the Enactment of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA, 
supra at 2 I I. The one monograph on this topic deals with an earlier (pre-ADA) point in time. 
See SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED 
PERSONS (I984). 
18 Several definitions have been offered in the literature, with a key distinction being the di-
viding line between "cause lawyers" and "lawyers for causes." See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAW-
YERS OF THE RIGHTs (2008); accord William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing 
Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, I06 YALE L.}. I623, 
I632 (I997); see also Scott Barclay & Anna-Maria Marshall, Supporting a Cause, Developing a 
Movement, and Consolidating a Practice: Cause Lawyers and Sexual Orientation Litigation in 
Vermont, in STRUCTURE AND AGENCY, supra note I 7, at I 7 I, I 74 ("The definition of cause law-
yering is broad, encompassing a variety of tactics and strategies and emphasizing the transforma-
tive goals and motivations of the attorneys engaged in the work.'). 
19 See United States v. Georgia, S46 U.S. IS I (2006); Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 
S4S U.S. II9 (2oos); Tennessee v. Lane, 54 I U.S. S09 (2004); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 
P.C. v. Wells, S38 U.S. 440 (2003); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, S40 U.S. 44 (2003); Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Echazabal, S36 U.S. 73 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, S3S U.S. 39I (2002); Toyota 
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, S34 U.S. I84 (2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, S32 U.S. 66I 
(200I); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, S3I U.S. 3S6 (200I); Olmstead v. L.C., S27 U.S. 
S8I (I999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, S27 U.S. SSS (I999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., S27 U.S. sr6 (I999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., S27 U.S. 47I (I999); Cleveland v. Policy 
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of the lawyers who filed these actions that have been litigated in the 
Supreme Court met this standard. Instead, these cases generally have 
been initiated by lawyers with limited civil rights experience, let alone 
experience with, and connection to, the broader disability rights 
movement. To the extent that cause lawyers for the disability rights 
community have been involved, they appear as amici or, more recently, 
as intervenors seeking creative ways to ensure that ADA cases that 
have already been filed by traditional tort lawyers are not decided by 
the Justices on the merits. 
Given the prominent role that cause lawyers have played in prior 
civil rights movements, the fact that committed and engaged disability 
rights advocates have had almost no role in selecting or structuring the 
Supreme Court's ADA agenda is surprising. It has also, we submit, 
left the movement vulnerable to just the kind of exploitation of its in-
ternal contradictions that Bagenstos describes. By carefully - or, as 
some have argued, ruthlessly - pushing only those cases that ad-
vanced a particular interpretation of the movement's objectives, cause 
lawyers such as Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall 
played a key role in making sure that their respective movements pre-
sented a unified and cohesive face to courts and the general public. 
The absence of any similar disciplining force in the ADA arena has left 
the articulation of the movement's message to the choices of individual 
litigants and their lawyers - parties that often have little or no inter-
est in presenting anything other than an interpretation of the statute 
and its reach that serves their own highly particularized interests. The 
result has been a series of Supreme Court cases attempting to stretch 
the ADA's coverage to novel, and often highly unusual and unpopular, 
circumstances. Not surprisingly, these claims rarely succeed. 
The ADA Supreme Court cases contrast sharply with those that 
cause lawyers for persons with disabilities have been actively pursuing 
under the ADA. Rather than focusing on Court cases as their prede-
cessors in other movements have done, these lawyers have focused 
their efforts on bringing suit with an eye toward settlement or district 
court victories on the relatively clear parts of the statute relating 
to access to areas of public accommodation. Their claims commonly 
represent a core set of ideas and commitments that members of the 
disability rights community broadly support. In bringing these kinds 
of cases, the movement's lawyers have sought to improve the daily 
lived experiences of their clients and also to stake out rights via set-
tlements that extend to the larger American disability community. 
Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999); Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). 
2010] CAUSE LAWYERING 
As these successes demonstrate, with the aid of the kind of careful 
deliberation about means and ends that committed and informed cause 
lawyers bring to their work, the disability rights movement can make 
important progress on its traditional rights- based antidiscrimination 
agenda despite the many internal contradictions Bagenstos identifies. 
Yet these same lawyers have played no similar role in crafting the 
ADA cases that have ended up before the Court. 
In the balance of this Review, we begin to explore why disability 
rights cause lawyers have largely chosen not to pursue the kind of Su-
preme Court litigation strategy followed by their predecessors - and 
even contemporaries - in other civil rights movements and why they 
should reconsider this strategy in light of Bagenstos's important crit-
ique. Unlike other social movements, disability rights lawyers since 
1990 have had something that other civil rights groups are still search-
ing for: a federal statute that not only purports to protect disabled 
Americans from express discrimination, but also requires employers 
and others to provide "reasonable accommodations" to ensure this 
group's full participation in society. 20 This circumstance reflects the 
historical context of disability cause lawyers. Operating in the after-
math of the civil rights movement, these advocates were able to lobby 
Congress successfully to pass a disability rights statute. At the same 
time, however, Congress promulgated imprecise statutory language 
that ultimately was susceptible to limiting judicial interpretation. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that these advocates have concentrated their 
efforts on enforcing these provisions in the lower federal courts. This 
is particularly true in light of the Justice Department's general ambi-
valence, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, to-
ward actively enforcing even the Act's basic provisions during most of 
this period (p. 125) and a growing skepticism by many progressives 
about the Supreme Court's ability to effect social changeY 
These and other similar reasons provide strong justification for dis-
ability rights cause lawyers to pursue a different path than the one 
that Charles Hamilton Houston and other traditional cause lawyers 
opted for in the past. They do not, however, counsel in favor of aban-
doning Supreme Court litigation altogether as the cause lawyers in this 
area seem to have done, let alone creating a significant shift away from 
the entire antidiscrimination paradigm. Although many of the prob-
lems faced by Americans with disabilities would undoubtedly be im-
proved by the passage of comprehensive social welfare programs such 
20 As Bagenstos discusses and others have recounted in more detail, cause lawyers were in-
strumental in getting the ADA passed. See Ziv, supra note 17. 
2! For a treatment of the difference in public enforcement between 1960s civil rights statutes 
and the ADA, see Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REv. 
434, 45<)-60 (2007). 
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as universal healthcare and comprehensive vocational training, the 
fact that these wholesale reforms have proven so politically daunting 
should caution disability rights advocates against directing all of their 
efforts toward achieving this important, but frustratingly elusive, goal. 
Instead, we urge these committed cause lawyers to pursue a multi-
layered strategy that seeks to combine advocacy for broad-based pro-
grams of the kind Bagenstos proposes with a carefully tailored litiga-
tion strategy. This strategy should be designed to present the Supreme 
Court with an appropriate - and appropriately compelling - case to 
elaborate some of the key elements of the ADA that have still received 
relatively little judicial attention notwithstanding the array of cases 
that the Court has already decided. Although such a strategy cannot 
guarantee that the Court will take whatever case these cause lawyers 
decide to pursue - let alone decide it in their favor - it would help 
to create a dialogue about the goals and priorities of the disability 
rights movement that could allow it to move forward despite its inter-
nal contradictions. 
The rest of this Review proceeds in four parts. Part II summarizes 
Bagenstos's argument about the tensions within the disability rights 
movement and describes his assessment of how these conflicts have 
played a key role in undermining the movement's effectiveness, par-
ticularly in the Supreme Court. Part ill documents the surprising ab-
sence of disability rights cause lawyers from Supreme Court ADA 
cases. It then provides a portrait of these disability rights movement 
attorneys. Next, Part ill examines the cases that disability rights 
cause lawyers have been bringing under the Act. These cases appear 
not to raise, or at least to elide, the contradictory shoals that Bagenstos 
argues have undermined the efforts of those interested in disability 
rights in the Court. Part IV then explains why these lawyers have 
pursued a strategy that places very little emphasis on the Court, noting 
that despite this strategy's broad success, it also has negatively im-
pacted the ADA's antidiscrimination agenda. Part V suggests that re-
cent events - including Bagenstos's appointment to head the Justice 
Department's efforts in this area- signal that the time has come for 
disability rights cause lawyers strategically to reengage Supreme Court 
litigation and provides some tentative suggestions for how these advo-
cates might do so in a way that could help resolve the contradictions 
Bagenstos describes. Part VI concludes. 
II. LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS 
Analyzing Supreme Court ADA jurisprudence, Law and Contradic-
tions maintains that the Court's decisions can be understood as align-
ing with one of a myriad of different advocacy positions advanced by 
the pluralistic disability rights movement. For example, Bagenstos ar-
gues that the "Court's definition-of-disability decisions are in many 
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ways quite consistent with the 'independence' frame many disability 
rights advocates employed in arguing for the ADA in the late I98os" 
(p. 39). Likewise, he argues that those decisions are "also consistent 
with an understanding of disability as defining a discrete, stigmatized 
minority group. Indeed, it would be hard to come up with a pattern of 
decisions that fit that understanding better than the bottom lines the 
Court has actually reached" (p. 4I).22 
Hence, the account by some advocates that judicial backlash 
against the ADA has impeded the statute's efficacy is "vastly over-
stated" (p. 2 ). Similarly, Bagenstos suggests that contrary to the back-
lash account, the post-ADA lack of increase in relative employment of 
persons with disabilities is caused by "inherent limitations of anti-
discrimination laws" (and especially the reasonable accommodation 
mandate) in eviscerating deeply entrenched social stigmas and their at-
tendant barriers (p. 2). In consequence, maximizing the salutary im-
pact of the ADA requires "confronting the tensions within disability 
rights thinking" and developing a coherent approach, rather than 
"simply criticizing" judicial opinions (p. I I). Bagenstos focuses on the 
strength and limits of the antidiscrimination agenda as one of the key 
issues on which clarity and consensus are crucial to fostering deeper 
legal and political engagement (p. u). Law and Contradictions sug-
gests that these tensions arise from the diverse constituents of the 
movement, disagreement over the breadth of ADA coverage, and con-
flict over what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. 
It bears noting that in aligning Court holdings with strains of disa-
bility rights thinking, Law and Contradictions does not restrict itself to 
arguments posed by lawyers in these cases. Instead, Bagenstos com-
pares the Court's reasoning to pre-ADA advocacy, a time when groups 
of individuals with distinct disabilities pursued advocacy that for-
warded the interests of only individuals with similar disabilities. More 
generally, Law and Contradictions derives themes and tensions of the 
disability rights movement from a broad array of sources and scholar-
ship that range beyond the Court's cases (pp. I2-33). And although 
the Court's opinions can be squared with one strand of disability 
rights thinking or another, Bagenstos does not contend that those 
strands were developed by cause lawyers. 
By way of background, Law and Contradictions describes the evo-
lution of the concept of "disability" from individual disability-specific 
movements to a pan-disability movement, beginning in the I 970s. 
Prominent in this transformation were the rise of the Independent Liv-
ing Movement (pp. I4-I6), the ideologically harmonious deinstitution-
alization movement of self-advocates (pp. I6-I8), and parent-driven 
22 A footnote has been omitted. 
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efforts toward inclusive education (p. 17). The r98os saw the rise of 
AIDS activists and the merging of the culturally Deaf into the larger 
disability movement (pp. r7-r8). Uniting these disparate advocacy 
strands together by providing a common focal point about which all 
can agree is the social model of disability. The social model views the 
socially constructed environment as causing disability. This model is 
in contrast to a medical model that deems disability an inherent and 
limiting characteristic. Since disabling conditions are artificial and 
remedial, disability rights advocates likened their circumstance to that 
of other historically excluded minority groups and advocated for simi-
lar civil rights-type remedies (pp. r8-2o). Yet despite coherence 
among disparate disability rights groups over adoption of the social 
model as a general mantra, Law and Contradictions identifies three 
considerable tensions within the collective enterprise. The first philo-
sophical tension is between those who see disability as universal and 
those who conceive of the disability category as a discrete minority 
(pp. 2o-2 r). The second "unacknowledged" tension in worldview a-
rises between disability rights advocates who feel disability profession-
als are paternalistic and oppressive and activists who rely upon the 
skills and assistance of those experts (pp. 2 r -2 2 ). The third and most 
significant tension revolves around independence (pp. 2 2-33). Al-
though every segment of the collective disability rights movement as-
pires to independence (and related notions of autonomy and dignity), 
these segments conflict over the meaning and extent of that notion. 
While persons with disabilities wish to live on their own and on their 
own terms, they often find themselves reliant on public assistance for 
the means through which to achieve this agency. Thus, there exists a 
deep divide within the movement as to the desirability of welfare in 
the pursuit of social equality. Each of these tensions is addressed in 
turn. 
Having identified the extent of the disability category to be pro-
tected under the ADA as controversial within the disability rights 
community, Law and Contradictions discusses pertinent Supreme 
Court opinions that limit the scope of statutory protection. These rul-
ings have held that the scope of disability coverage is to be narrowly 
defined, confined to those conditions that seriously limit individuals' 
ability to perform major life activities, prevent employees with disabil-
ities from engaging in a range of related work activities, continue to 
present such barriers even in their mitigated (namely, post-medicated) 
states, or involve more than mere imputation of stereotypes (pp. 35-
40). Contrary to prevailing wholesale criticisms of these opinions, Law 
and Contradictions maintains that they are consistent with key ele-
ments of disability rights advocacy that concentrate on individuals 
whose disabilities are beyond question and who want to enter the 
workplace to gain independence from public benefits or who expe-
rience stigma and subordination (pp. 41-44). Thus, the exclusion from 
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ADA coverage of already employed individuals with near-sightedness, 
high blood pressure, and carpal tunnel syndrome - economically em-
powered people whose disabilities exist at the fringe of the category-
is on a level with beliefs deeply held by elements of the disability 
movement who embrace independence and minority models of disabil-
ity. To achieve an opposite approach, that of universal coverage, re-
quires a political solution (pp. 53-54). 
The second inherent tension among disability rights advocates 
highlighted by Law and Contradictions involves divergent perspectives 
toward disability experts. Some movement members abhor these indi-
viduals for the historical paternalism and control they have imposed 
on the disability community, while others view experts as instrumen-
tally valuable, if not allies, in achieving goals. Because much of disa-
bility discrimination, according to Law and Contradictions, arises from 
safety fears - say, the person with a disability is thought contagious, 
or in danger of falling in harm's way-- courts rely upon the judgment 
of public health officials in assessing risk (pp. 76-82 ). The Court's 
ADA cases in which persons with disabilities were excluded from 
workplace opportunities based on professional assessments of the risks 
those plaintiffs allegedly posed exemplify to one part of the disability 
rights community the paternalistic politics underlying "neutral" evalua-
tions (pp. 82-94). By contrast, another segment of the disability 
movement deems protection of fetuses and infants with disabilities and 
prohibitions on assisted suicide necessary safeguards against social 
mores that undervalue the quality of life and contributions of people 
with disabilities (pp. 95-I I I). Without taking sides in this matter, al-
though it expresses sympathy for an alternative that favors autonomy 
(p. IJ4), Law and Contradictions notes tensions even within these 
drawn lines. 
It is in discussing the third tension amongst disability rights advo-
cates, concerning the meaning of independence and the vehicles neces-
sary to achieve equality, that Law and Contradictions addresses the fu-
ture of American disability law. At the heart of the matter is a 
philosophical gulf between disability rights advocates on their views of 
what constitutes independence and the role that antidiscrimination 
norms can play in achieving that goal. In the course of citing (pp. 
u6-I9) and questioning (pp. II9-28) the bleak statistics on the rela-
tive post-ADA employment rate of people with disabilities, Law and 
Contradictions contends that the antidiscrimination agenda may even 
contribute to socioeconomic disparities because, despite its promise, it 
cannot by itself unseat deeply entrenched social stigmas (pp. I I8-2o). 
Instead, the future of disability law lies in a combination of increased 
governmental enforcement of existing rights (pp. I32-35), expansion of 
public health insurance in a manner that would allow more people 
with disabilities to work without losing access to health care (pp. IJ8-
42), and greater consumer control of disability benefits (pp. I4I-45). 
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Deciding how to balance these considerations as part of a unified polit-
ical effort is an unresolved but crucial issue for the pluralistic disabili-
ty rights movement. 
III. THE NONTRADITIONAL ROLE OF 
DISABILITY CAUSE LAWYERS 
Civil rights movements have always had lawyers bringing cases to 
challenge exclusionary social power structuresP Across these prede-
cessor movements, cause lawyers have boldly pursued systemic litiga-
tion.24 At times, the attorneys have even placed the movement's 
broader objectives ahead of their individual clients' particular interests 
in order to take opportune cases to the Supreme Court.25 Below, we 
will demonstrate how the disability movement has what can and 
should be considered "disability cause lawyers," although they have 
operated in somewhat nontraditional ways. Contrary to predecessor 
movements, the most visible disability rights cases - those receiving 
Supreme Court adjudication - are notable for the absence of cause 
lawyers. 
Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish the cause lawyers 
we are discussing from the "advocates" Bagenstos describes in Law 
and Contradictions. Part of Bagenstos's significant contribution to the 
disability rights literature is to explain the role of advocates and activ-
ists in the creation of a modern disability movement. The relationship 
between politicians, social advocates, and lawyers in developing social 
movem'ents is a complex one that goes beyond the scope of this Re-
view. Rather, we confine our focus to cause lawyers and exploring 
their place in the pluralism of the disability rights movement. Cause 
." 
23 See Austin 'sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Profes-
sional Authority: An Introduction, in POLITICAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 17, at 3, 4 
("Cause lawyering ... is frequently directed at altering some aspect of the social, economic, and 
political status quo.'); Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, The Dynamics of Cause Lawyering: Con-
straints and Opportunities, in STRUCTURE AND AGENCY, supra note 17, at 1, 9 ("[Cause law-
yers] work with, and against, prevailing conceptions of how legal practices can and should be or-
ganized ... .'). 
24 See generally STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING To BELIEVE IN: 
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004). 
25 See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of Three High 
Profile Government Lawsuits, 86 DENV. U. L REV. 457, 489 (2009) ("With regard to the NAACP's 
legal campaign to end segregated schools, lawyers pursued a campaign of litigation ... in the 
manner the lawyers thought best for the broader cause of desegregation ... even where doing so 
may have been in tension with the individual interests of the clients being represented in a partic-
ular suit.'); Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 1633-34 ("Marshall and the other covenant attorneys" 
when litigating the Shelley case saw the decision whether to pursue certiorari "as a legal tactical 
question about getting the 'right' case to the Court at the 'right' time. In their view, such ques-
tions would not be ceded to the clients, who were merely placeholders in their campaign, but 
would be decided by lawyers."). 
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lawyers, as we use the term, have a more specific role than shaping a 
movement, or at least a more specific set of tools at their disposal in 
doing so. They can craft litigation - or use the threat of litigation -
on behalf of a cause and exert a measure of influence over how the 
work of courts can influence the internal and external perceptions of a 
movement. Our analysis also tracks that of Law and Contradictions 
by looking exclusively at ADA claims. Although other federal statutes 
protecting the rights of people with disabilities have been litigated 
both before and after 1990,Z6 the ADA represents the most comprehen-
sive domestic legal and policy statement on the rights of people with 
disabilities27 and is therefore the focus of study. 
Section ill.A provides an empirical view into the identity and pro-
fessional expertise of those lawyers who argued the eighteen Supreme 
Court ADA cases. It then evaluates the consequences of the unique 
circumstance that none of those attorneys was a cause lawyer on be-
half of the group they were representing before the Court. Thrning to 
the disability cause lawyers, section ill.B describes those individuals 
and section III.C offers a snapshot of the types of cases they bring. 
A. Supreme Court Litigation 
The Supreme Court has thus far heard eighteen Americans with 
Disabilities Act cases. 28 Each case involved an individual plaintiff as-
serting an individual claim under the statute, and involved rights that 
are fundamental to the ADA's central mission of integrating people 
with disabilities into society. These assertions include claims for com-
munity-based treatment options,Z9 freedom from workplace discrimi-
26 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 140o-1482 (2006) (addressing 
discrimination in education), the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 
(2006) (addressing discrimination in housing), the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, id. 
§§ 1997-1997j (protecting people in institutions), and the Medicaid Act, id. §§ 1396a(a)-1396v, are 
others. 
27 See Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1068 
(July 26, 1990) ("This historic act is the world's first comprehensive declaration of equality for 
people with disabilities [and] has made the United States the international leader on this human 
rights issue.''). A more international and holistic approach to disability rights is the United Na-
tions Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61!Io6, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007). For an assessment comparing this approach to United States fed-
eral law, see MICHAEL STEIN & MICHAEL WATERSTONE, NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, 
FINDING THE GAPS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISABILITY LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DIS-
ABILITIES (CRPD) (2008}, available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publicationsl2oo8/pdf/ 
ncd_crpd_analysis.pdf. 
28 See cases cited supra note 19. 
29 See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
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nation,30 equal access to dental care,31 and nondiscrimination in an 
athletic tournament,32 amongst others. 
Yet none of these eighteen Supreme Court cases was initiated or 
argued by lawyers who spend a significant part of their professional 
time on disability rights cases or have a formal connection to a disabil-
ity rights organization. The initiating attorneys ranged from general 
employment lawyers to solo practitioners handling a wide portfolio of 
cases (personal injury, trusts and wills, and so forth) but without sig-
nificant civil rights experience, to large-firm practitioners who normal-
ly focus on transactional litigation. In one instance, Bragdon v. Ab-
bott,33 suit was initiated by the Boston office of Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and Defenders,34 which is a cause lawyering organization, 
but not one centered on disability advocacy. Table 1 demonstrates the 
practice experience of the lawyers involved at the district court level 
with each of the cases eventually heard by the Supreme Court during 
the period of the ADA's existence. 
Academics have recently begun to explore the role of the elite and 
specialized appellate and Supreme Court bar.35 As would be expected, 
as the eighteen cases eventually heard by the Court ascended through 
the federal system, some of the lawyers changed. In some instances, 
lawyers with experience in appellate and Supreme Court litigation en-
tered the picture on the plaintiffs' side. Yet generally speaking, these 
lawyers at the Supreme Court stage still fell short of "elite" Supreme 
Court status - those attorneys who are brought in to argue significant 
cases.36 In several instances, the lawyers who argued for the disability 
30 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 
535 U.S. 391 (2002); Toyota Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Albertson's, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
31 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
32 See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
33 524 U.S. 624. 
34 See Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Our Work - Bragdon v. Abbott, 
http://www.glad.org/worklcases/bragdon-v-abbott (last visited Mar. 2 7, 2010). 
35 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008). 
36 Professor Lazarus suggests that a "measure of an expert Supreme Court advocate is some-
one who has ... presented at least five oral arguments before the Court or works with a law firm 
or other organization with attorneys who in the aggregate have presented a total of at least ten 
arguments before the Court." /d. at 1490 n.17. By this standard, using the same data set as set 
forth below, infra note 37, only 27% of the lawyers who argued at the Supreme Court for the 
ADA claimant would be considered "expert counsel." When the government lawyers (who by na-
ture of their job have significant experience before the Supreme Court) are removed from consid-
eration, the number is only 8%. Of the nongovernmental Supreme Court advocates, almost two-
thirds were making their first Supreme Court argument in their ADA case. For over half, their 
ADA Supreme Court case is their only Supreme Court case thus far in their respective careers. 
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TABLE I. LAWYERS AT DISTRICT COURT LEVEL FOR EACH 
SUPREME COURT CASE -PRACTICE EXPERIENCE 
FROM 1990 TO CASE FILING3 7 
CASE RELEVANT EXPERIENCE 
United States v. Georgia (none) 
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Torts/Negligence: 6.52% 
Ltd. Civil Rights: 4.35% 
Tennessee v. Lane Torts/Negligence: 4.5 5% 
Civil Rights: 13.64% 
Clackamas Gastroenterology Torts/Negligence: 2 o.oo% 
Assocs. P.C. v. Wells Civil Rights: 24.20% 
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez Civil Rights: 5o.oo% 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Torts/Negligence: 33.33% 
Echazabal 
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Civil Rights: 40.oo% 
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. (none) 
Williams 
PGA Tour Inc. v. Martin Torts/Negligence: 2 2. 2 2% 
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Disability Discrimination: 14.10% 
Garrett Civil Rights: 2_9.50% 
Olmstead v. L.C. (none) 
Albertson's, Inc. v. Torts/Negligence: 12.59% 
Kirkingburg Civil Rights: .'i4.oz% 
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Disability Discrimination: 8.33% 
Inc. Torts/Negligence: 8.33% 
Civil Rights: 33.33% 
37 Our methodology for Tables 1 and 2 was as follows: For each of the ADA Supreme Court 
cases, see supra note 19, at the district, appellate, certiorari, and Supreme Court stages, we rec-
orded the case number, case title, filing date, court, and lawyers. For the district and appellate 
stages, the inclusion criterion for lawyers was appearance on the docket. Dockets were obtained 
through Westlaw and PACER. At the certiorari stage, lawyers were included if listed on the brief 
for the ADA claimant, whether petitioner or respondent. At the Supreme Court level, lawyers 
were included if listed within the decision's syllabus. We t!Ien collected two sets of data on each 
lawyer's litigation history through Westlaw Profiler's Litigation History Reports. The first set 
captured data between 1990 (the passage of the ADA) and the year prior to the case filing date. 
The second set captured data between 1990 and 2009. We captured data including, but not li-
mited to: total cases, primary and secondary practice areas, civil rights, torts and negligence, disa-
bility discrimination, employment and labor, housing, public accommodation, and Supreme Court 
experience. Because the availability of Westlaw's Litigation History Reports depends on volunta-
ry inclusion, there are certain lawyers for whom information was not available. Most notably, 
information was not available for Bennett Klein - who, from district to Supreme Court, argued 
Bragdon- or at the appellate stage for Murphy. Thus, our sample was drawn from a total of 26 
out of 30 (86.7%) lawyers at the district court, 22 out of 24 (91.7%) lawyers at the appellate level, 
37 out of 40 (92.5%) lawyers at the certiorari stage, and 33 out of 34 (97.1%) lawyers at the Su-
preme Court leveL Overall, we were able to capture u8 out of 128 lawyers, or 92.2% of t!Ie pop-
ulation. 
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Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. Torts/Negligence: 7.69% 
Civil Ri_g_hts: _.1.8_i% 
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Torts/Negligence: 14.29% 
Corp. 
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Civil Rights: 12 .so% 
Corp. 
Bragdon v. Abbott Public Accommodation: 4· 76% 
Housing: 4· 76% 
Civil Rights: 33.33% 
Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey Civil Rights: 16.67% 
rights claimants were making their first appearance before the Court.38 
The Supreme Court lawyers were also not consistently what we would 
classify as disability cause lawyers. In two cases, the lawyers who ar-
gued before the Court had significant experience in disability law or 
civil rights cases and some connection to disability organizations.39 
But these instances were an exception to the rule, with most lawyers 
appearing before the Court lacking expertise and connection to the 
disability rights community. Table 2 demonstrates the civil rights ex-
perience of the lawyers involved at the Supreme Court level with each 
of the cases that went up to the Supreme Court over the course of the 
ADA's enactment. 
The complete absence of disability cause lawyers from the list of 
those initiating ADA cases eventually heard by the Court, as well as 
their limited role at the appellate level, clearly diverges from predeces-
sor social movements in which key cases traditionally have been in-
itiated and litigated by cause lawyers. As indicated above, the litiga-
tion leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education40 was almost exclusively controlled by cause lawyers. 41 
Even after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, cause lawyers 
have continued to play a significant role in the cases that have come 
38 This observation is empirical rather than editorial. For a discussion of first-time arguers 
before the Supreme Court, see Christine M. Macey, Referral Is Not Required: How Inexperienced 
Supreme Court Advocates Can Fulfill Their Ethical Obligations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 979 
(2009). 
39 Claudia Center, a lawyer with the Employment Law Center in San Francisco with exten-
sive experience in disability cases, argued the plaintiff's case before the Supreme Court in US 
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Bagenstos, who had extensive civil rights expe-
rience but no formal connection to the disability rights movement, argued the plaintiff's case in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); and 
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). 
40 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
41 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 127 (1994) (describing a lawyers' conference organized by Marshall to 
determine future litigation toward school desegregation and the resulting approaches adopted). 
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TABLE 2. PRACTICE EXPERIENCE OF LAWYERS AT 
SUPREME COURT FROM 1990 TO CASE FILING 
CASE RELEVANT EXPERIENCE 
United States v. Georgia ADA Employment: 0.17% 
Disability Discrimination: 0.2 I% 
Civil Rights: o.84% 
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Public Accommodation: o.63% 
Line Ltd. Housing: 0.99% 
ADA Employment: 0.36% 
Disability Discrimination: 0.36% 
Torts/Negligence: 45 -43% 
Civil Rights: 4.66% 
Tennessee v. Lane ADA Empioyment: I .4 7% 
Disability Discrimination: 5 .88% 
Torts/Negligence: 1.47% 
Civil Rights: 4-4I% 
Clackamas Gastroenterology Housing: 1.25% 
Assocs., P.C. v. Wells ADA Employment: 1.88% 
Disability Discrimination: I .88% 
Torts/Negligence: I3.I3% 
Civil Rights: I6.88% 
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez Disability Discrimination: I5.63% 
Civil Rights: 9.38% 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. ADA Employment: I 2.90% 
Echazabal Disability Discrimination: 6-45% 
Torts/Negligence: 3.23% 
Civil Rights: 45.I6% 
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Disability Discrimination: 33.33% 
Civil Rights: 25.oo% 
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. Disability Discrimination: 28.57% 
v. Williams Civil Rights: 7.14% 
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin Public Accommodation: 1.92% 
Torts/Negligence: 17.3I% 
Civil Rights: 17.3I% 
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. Torts/Negligence: I6. 70% 
v. Garrett Civil Rights: I 1.10% 
Olmstead v. L.C. Disability Discrimination: 5.I3% 
Torts/Negligence: 5.I3% 
Civil Rights: 20.5I% 
Albertson's, Inc. v. ADA Employment: 1.72% 
Kirkingburg Disability Discrimination: 6.90% 
Torts/Negligence: I3.79% 
Civil Rights: 13.79% 
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Murphy v. United Parcel Disability Discrimination: 8. 70% 
Serv., Inc. Civil Rights: 4·35% 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Disability Discrimination: 3.5 7% 
Inc. Civil Rights: P4% 
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Disability Discrimination: 8.33% 
Sys. Corp. Torts/Negligence: 16.67% 
Civil Rights: 12.50% 
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Civil Rights: 2o.oo% 
Corp. 
Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey Torts/Negligence: 1.56% 
Civil Rights: 20.31% 
before the Court. The attorneys in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,42 a fun-
damental Title VII case, were all established civil rights litigators with 
connections to the NAACP from the district court level upward.43 
Another seminal Title VII case, International Union, UAW v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc.,44 featured an alliance of women's rights, labor rights, 
and workplace safety activists, all of whom were deeply involved in 
the case from the earliest stages.45 Bowers v. Hardwick,46 a prominent 
sexual orientation rights case, was brought after the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) offered to represent Michael Hardwick and 
use his circumstances to challenge the constitutionality of anti-sodomy 
42 40I U.S. 424 (I97I) (holding that facially neutral practices, procedures, or tests that are dis-
criminatory in effect cannot be used to preserve the status quo of employment discrimination). 
43 The earliest recorded opinion in the case shows J. LeVonne Chambers and Conrad 0. Pear-
son as counsel for the plaintiff. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 244 (M.D.N.C. 
I968). Chambers was a civil rights litigator (now law professor) who had previously worked for 
the NAACP. See JULIUS L. CHAMBERS PAPERS, I902-I989 (Univ. of N.C. at Charlotte I996), 
available at http://dlib.uncc.edu/special_collections/manuscripts/html/85.php. Pearson had been 
one of the lawyers in Hocutt v. Wilson, Civ. No. I-I88 (N.C. Super. Ct., Mar. 28, I933), one of the 
first challenges to segregation in higher education. At the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court, 
Jack Greenberg, the director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund who argued Brown v. 
Board of Education, was the lead lawyer for plaintiffs. See Griggs, 40I U.S. 424, 425 (I97I); 
Griggs, 420 F.2d I225, I227 (4th Cir. I970). 
44 499 U.S. I87 (I99I). Johnson Controls applied the "bona fide occupational qualification" 
defense to a company's policy of excluding fertile women, but not men, from the workplace. /d. 
at 200. 
45 See Caroline Bettinger-L6pez & Susan Sturm, International Union, U.A.W. v. Johnson Con-
trols: The History of Litigation Alliances and Mobilization To Challenge Fetal Protection Policies, 
in MYRIAM E. GILLES & RlSA L. GOLUBOFF, CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 2 I I, 2 IJ (2008) ("[John-
son Controls] illustrates the impact of relationships among repeat players in the legal advocacy 
community, particularly the strong relationships between labor attorneys in the UAW and feminist 
attorneys in national women's rights organizations.'). The United Auto Workers filed the com-
plaint in Johnson Controls with the plan that it would be a "test case, a policy case" that could 
eventually go to the Supreme Court. See id. at 228 (citing JULIANA S. GONEN, LITIGATION AS 
LOBBYING 58 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
46 4 78 U.S. I86 (I986). 
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laws.47 Even in cases where those promoting the interests of minori-
ties have been on the defendant's side, the lawyers involved have 
tended to possess significant civil rights experience. In the University 
of Michigan affirmative action cases,48 for example, the university was 
represented by John Payton, a lawyer with substantial experience with 
and connection to the black civil rights movement. Mr. Payton is now 
the Director Counsel of the Legal Defense Fund.49 It is clear that in 
other social movements, experienced lawyers with connections to civil 
rights organizations were involved in key cases from the beginning.50 
Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to state that cause law-
yers have had no involvement in Supreme Court disability cases. Ra-
ther than initiating, directing, and arguing the cases, cause lawyers 
have two roles. The most visible example is that in nearly every Su-
preme Court case, disability rights organizations filed amicus briefs at 
the appellate and Supreme Court level. This role has grown over time. 
In Bragdon, the first ADA Supreme Court case, disability organiza-
tions coordinated on one main amicus brief.51 In Goodman v. Geor-
gia,52 the most recent ADA Supreme Court case (and the only one 
heard so far by the Roberts Court), the five amicus briefs reflected a 
broader cross-section of the disability advocacy community and were 
more strategic in nature.53 Cause lawyers have consistently used ami-
cus briefs as a tool in Supreme Court cases in all other civil rights 
areas.54 
47 See William H. Eskridge, Jr., The Crime Against Nature on Trial: Bowers v. Hardwick, 
1986, in GILLES & GOLUBOFF, supra note 45, at 156. 
48 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
49 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47 How. L.J. 
499, 533-34 (2004)-
50 For a detailed description of the actions of a prime protagonist, see TUSHNET, supra note 
41. 
51 See Brief of the AIDS Action Council et a!. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (I998) (No. 97-IS6), I998 WL 47252. 
52 546 u.s. IS I (2006). 
53 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Disability Rights Network in Support of Petitioners, 
Goodman, 546 U.S. ISI (Nos. 04-I203, 04-I236), 2005 WL I8uo6o; Brief for ADAPT eta!. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Goodman, 546 U.S. ISI (Nos. 04-I203, o4-I236), 2005 WL 
I8uo6I; Brief of the American Association on Mental Retardation eta!. in Support of Petitioners, 
Goodman, 546 U.S. ISI (Nos. 04-I203, 04-I236), 2005 WL I8I2485; Brief of the Honorable Dick 
Thornburgh and the National Organization on Disability as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, Goodman, 546 U.S. ISI (Nos. 04-I203, 04-I236), 2005 WL I8263I7. In Goodman, many of 
these briefs were written by cause lawyers. So, for example, the lawyers who wrote the Goodman 
amicus brief for Dick Thornburgh and the National Organization on Disability included Arlene 
Mayerson (Director, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund), Eve Hill (then-Director, Disa-
bility Rights Legal Center), and academics Peter Blanck (Chairman, Burton Blatt Institute) and 
Michael Waterstone (chair, American Association of Law Schools's Section on Disability Law). 
54 See Bettinger-L6pez & Sturm, supra note 45; see also CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS 
ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 
I63--67 (I9S9) (describing the NAACP's strategy of using amici curiae briefs in restrictive cove-
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Another important but less noticed contribution by disability rights 
cause lawyers involves their efforts to prevent cases from being heard 
by the Court.55 Many disability rights advocates feel that a conserva-
tive Rehnquist Court had weakened the ADA by handing down da-
maging precedents,56 and especially so in cases with marginal fact pat-
terns_57 Consequently, some long-time disability cause lawyers have 
urged withdrawal or settlement of ADA cases granted certiorari,58 with 
nant cases before the U.S. Supreme Court); STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGA-
TION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 219-35 (1995). 
55 This strategy is not unique to disability rights lawyers. See, e.g., HANS ]. HACKER, THE 
CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION (2005) (discussing the amicus strategies 
of Christian Right cause lawyers). For a discussion of progressive groups generally trying to avoid 
the Supreme Court or to ensure narrow holdings, see Richard L. Hasen, How Liberals Can Win 
by Losing at the Roberts Court, SLATE, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2228257· Of late, 
cause lawyers for the gay rights movement have used this strategy with some success. In Smelt v. 
County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 447 
F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006), a same-sex couple sought a marriage license from the county clerk's of-
fice. See Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 864. After suing in federal court to challenge their denial, de-
fendants argued that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the Defense of Marriage Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). On 
appeal, cause lawyers for the gay rights movement (Lambda Legal and the National Center for 
Lesbian Rights, representing Equality California), intervened, arguing that plaintiffs did not have 
standing and should abstain. The intervenors prevailed in the Ninth Circuit, thus evading poten-
tial Supreme Court review. See Smelt, 447 F.3d at 686. 
56 See Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality 
Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2003) [hereinafter Soifer, Disabling the ADA] ("The 
Court's recent deconstruction of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides a series of 
striking illustrations. In the name of essences that the Justices alone can discern, the Court re-
peatedly ignores or overrules Congress. It also rejects interpretations painstakingly worked out 
by lower court judges. The Court has turned an important civil rights statute into an unseemly 
hash." (citations omitted)); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall 
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, roo (1999); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the 
ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY]. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000); Aviam Soifer, 
The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1299-
1307 (2000) [hereinafter Soifer, The Disability Term] (discussing courts' restrictive interpretation of 
the "regarded as" definition). 
57 See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (upholding the accommodation right 
of a disabled professional golfer to use a golf cart rather than walk during a PGA tour); see also 
Soifer, Disabling the ADA, supra note 56, at 1301 ("The case [PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin] may be 
hard to take entirely seriously. For one thing, it seems so easily confined to its facts: the very un-
usual circumstance of an extraordinarily talented, dedicated plaintiff who has a clear, rare disabil-
ity, yet who still does exceptionally well competing in a commercial sports event that actually is 
open to anyone willing to pay a hefty entrance fee to enter the competition."). 
58 This was true for Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), ultimately a victory for disability 
rights plaintiffs, which held that Title II of the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity 
insofar as it was intended to protect the fundamental right of access to courts. /d. Before Lane, 
this proposition was very much open, with advocates fearing that the Supreme Court would do 
with Title II what it had done to Title I in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Gar-
rett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), in which it held under sovereign immunity principles that the entirety of 
Title I was not valid section 5 legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The disability rights 
advocates who campaigned against having Lane heard did so despite a sympathetic fact pattern: 
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a pair of victories. One instance was Hasan v. Medical Board of Cali-
fornia,59 where Dr. Hason's application for a medical license was de-
nied on the grounds of his mental illness. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to decide whether or not under these circumstances Title II 
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.60 In light of an unsympa-
thetic plaintiff and the Court's opinion in Garrett,61 California dis-
ability rights advocates followed a creative strategy to get the case off 
of the Court's docket before it could be heard. The advocates pre-
vailed upon then-Governor of California, Gray Davis, to appoint a 
new member of the Medical Board who was supportive of disability 
rights. The Board then agreed to reconsider the case and reverse its 
decision. At that point, the case was moot and the writ of certiorari 
was dismissed.62 
B. Disability Cause Lawyers 
Despite its absence from Supreme Court ADA cases, there is a vi-
brant professional advocacy community around these issues. Disabili-
ty cause lawyers have actively been enforcing the statute in the lower 
federal courts. These lawyers spend significant amounts of time on 
disability rights cases, both at the private and public interest levels. 
They span the country, although they tend to be focused in the larger 
cities, with an emphasis in Washington, D.C. and northern California. 
Some of these organizations, such as the National Federation for the 
Blind, are primarily designed to serve individuals with a specific disa-
bility.63 Others, like the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, serve the 
entire disabled population.64 There also are organizations such as the 
Bazelon Center that were developed to serve one sector (for example, 
people with mental disabilities), yet over time have expanded their ad-
vocacy.65 Still others have a more general civil rights orientation, but 
with significant experience in disability cases. The Employment Law 
George Lane was compelled to appear in court on the second floor of an inaccessible courthouse 
and jailed when he declined to be carried up the stairs. See Lane, 54 I U.S. at 5 I3-I4. 
59 279 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 
60 ld. 
61 See Garrett, 53I U.S. 356. Hason preceded Lane, so it is left to conjecture as to how these 
advocates would have responded if Lane had already been handed down. 
62 Hason, 279 F.3d 1167, cert. dismissed, 538 U.S. 958 (2003). This narrative of events was 
based on an interview with Eve Hill, who at the time was the Executive Director of the Disability 
Rights Legal Center and was intimately involved in the advocates' efforts. Telephone Interview 
with Eve Hill, former Executive Dir., Disability Rights Legal Ctr. (Oct. I, 2009). The second in-
stance was Klingler v. Director, Dep't of Revenue, 366 F.3d 6I4 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 
I I I I (2005). 
63 National Federation of the Blind, http://www.nfb.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
64 Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, http://www.ccdconline.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2010~ 
65 Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, http://www.bazelon.org/about/ 
index.htm#history (last visited Mar. 2 7, 20IO). 
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Center is one such example.66 In Table 3, we identify some of the 
more engaged public interest organizations and private law firms that 
bring a significant number of high-profile disability cases and give 
brief details on their geographic locations and targeted practice areas.67 
In addition to these public interest and private firms, the Protection 
and Advocacy System (P&A) could be viewed as a species of disability 
cause lawyer.68 P&A is a federally mandated network of organizations 
that exists to protect and advance the interests of people with deve-
lopmental disabilities and has at least one office in every state.69 Some 
offices maintain active litigation agendas, while others do not. 70 The 
National Disability Rights Network is the nonprofit membership or-
ganization for the P&A. 7 1 
66 The Legal Aid Society: Employment Law Center, http://www.las-elc.org/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
67 The descriptions of practice areas are taken from the organizations' respective websites. 
68 For a discussion of this view, see Gary P. Gross, The Protection and Advocacy System and 
Collaboration with Legal Services Programs, MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE]., Summer 2001, at 1, 
available at http://www.napas.org/aboutus!MIEarticleFinalJO 1 .htm. 
69 42 u.s.c. § 15041 (2006). 
70 For example, the California offices of Protection and Advocacy have litigated cases involv-
ing housing, MediCal (the California version of Medicaid), and services for people with mental 
disabilities. See Disability Rights California, Cases, http://pai-ca.org/advocacy/cases.htm (last vi-
sited Mar. 27, 2010). 
71 The P&A network is collectively "the largest provider of legally based advocacy services to 
people with disabilities in the United States." National Disability Rights Network, About Us, 
http://www.napas.org/aboutus/default.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). Of course, there are sever-
al federal agencies tasked with being the "public enforcers" of the ADA. Although the list is long, 
the primary agencies with enforcement authority are the Department of Justice and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. For a critique of the enforcement efforts, see Waterstone, 
supra note 2 1. 
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TABLE 3· ORGANIZATIONS AND PRACTICE AREAS 
(A) PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS 
ORGANIZATION GEOGRAPHIC PRACTICE AREA 
REGION 
Disability Rights Berkeley, Cal. A disability-specific non-profit law 
Advocates (DRA) firm dedicated to securing the civil 
rights of people with disabilities. 
DRA advocates for disability rights 
through high-impact litigation, as 
well as research and education. 
Disability Rights Berkeley, Cal. A disability-specific organization 
Education & whose mission "is to advance the 
Defense Fund civil and human rights of people 
with disabilities through legal ad-
vocacy, training, education, and 
public policy and legislative 
development." 
Judge David L. Washington, Mission "is to protect and advance 
Bazelon Center for D.C. the rights of adults and children 
Mental Health who have mental disabilities. The 
Law Center envisions an America where 
people who have mental illnesses or 
developmental disabilities exercise 
their own life choices and have 
access to the resources that enable 
them to participate fully in their 
communities." 
Disability Rights Los Angeles, A disability-specific organization 
Legal Center Cal. whose mission "is to promote the 
rights of people with disabilities 
and the public interest in and 
awareness of those rights by pro-
viding legal and related services." 
This is a cross-disability 
organization. 
Colorado Cross- Denver, Colo. A disability-specific organization 
Disability that engages in advocacy to protect 
Coalition civil rights of all types of people 
with disabilities. 
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Employment Law San Francisco, "[P]romotes the stability of low in-
Center (ELC) Cal. come and disadvantaged workers 
and their families by addressing is-
sues that affect their ability to 
achieve self-sufficiency." ELC has 
a disability-specific program that 
focuses on litigation. 
The Impact Fund Berkeley, Cal. "[P]rovides strategic leadership and 
support for litigation to achieve 
economic and social justice," in-
eluding provision of "funds for im-
pact litigation in the areas of civil 
rights, environmental justice, and 
poverty law." The Impact Fund is 
lead counsel in several high-profile 
civil rights class action cases. 
The Public Interest Philadelphia, Uses "public education, continuing 
Law Center of Pa. education of [its] clients and client 
Philadelphia organizations, research, negotiation 
and, when necessary, the courts to 
achieve systemic reforms that ad-
vance the central goals of self-
advocacy, social justice and equal 
protection of the law for all mem-
hers of society." 
(B) FOR-PROFIT LAW FIRMS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS 
ORGANIZATION GEOGRAPHIC PRACTICE AREA 
REGION 
Fox & Robertson, Denver, Colo. A civil rights practice with heavy 
P.C. emphasis on "promoting the rights 
of individuals with disabilities to 
full enjoyment and equal treatment 
in businesses, housing, government 
services, transportation and 
employment." 
Brown, Goldstein Baltimore, Md. General trial lawyers who have a 
& LevyLLP specialized practice in several high-
profile disability cases and offer a 
Disability Rights Fellowship to a 
recent law graduate with a disabili-
ty to litigate disability rights cases. 
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Goldstein, Oakland, Cal. A plaintiff's public interest class 
Demchak, Baller, action law firm. 
Borgen & 
Dardarian 
Law Offices of Miami, Fla. A general civil rights firm with 
Matthew W. heavy emphasis on disability rights 
Dietz cases in employment, public servic-
es, and privately owned places of 
public accommodation. 
Law Offices of Jenkintown, A general practitioner with a disa-
David Ferleger Pa. bility practice, specializing in de-
velopmental disabilities, retarda-
tion, mental health, physical 
disabilities, community services, 
and community placement. 
Schneider Wallace San Francisco, Class action lawyers with emphasis 
Cottrell Brayton Cal. on enforcing civil and consumer 
Konecky LLP rights. 
C. Cases by Disability Cause Lawyers 
This section offers a representative snapshot of the work of the var-
ious disability cause lawyers and organizations identified above in sec-
tion III.B.72 Strikingly apparent is how their work differs in structure 
72 As a related matter, we note that in addition to the cause lawyers profiled above, there also 
exists a group of lawyers who could potentially be viewed as representing the disability rights 
cause. Often referred to as "serial litigators," these lawyers are somewhat controversial for bring-
ing a high volume of cases under the ADA's public accommodations provisions or comparable 
state law. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case 
of "Abusive" ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2oo6). TYPically, these lawyers bring 
access lawsuits against businesses, often filing multiple lawsuits at once, pursuing early settle-
ments, representing the same clients as lead plaintiffs, and initiating their claims with a demand 
letter to the challenged business. Many of these lawyers practice in California, where under state 
law a plaintiff in access litigation is entitled to damages. See CAL. CIV. CODE§§ 52(a), 54·3 (West 
Supp. 2006). These lawyers have been derided by courts and commentators for extorting quick 
settlements without pushing for meaningful access improvements and abusing the court system. 
See, e.g., Walter Olson, The ADA Shakedown Racket, CITY J., Winter 2004, at So, 82, 83. The 
Ninth Circuit has deemed at least one lawyer-client team as vexatious litigants. See Molski v. 
Evergreen Dynasty, soo F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). Others assert that these lawyers are challeng-
ing legitimate violations of the ADA and state access laws and that their activities are an inevita-
ble result of a statute with broad coverage, a limited remedial scheme, and weak public enforce-
ment. See Bagenstos, supra, at 4-5. We agree with Bagenstos that these lawyers provide a 
valuable public service, but we have not included them in our initial analysis because their con-
tributions to the broader movement are tangential to their primary focus of culling income 
through damage awards (while also serving the public), rather than advancing the tenets of or 
having connection to the larger disability rights community. In addition, the type of suits brought 
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and shape from those ADA cases before the Court. Namely, each suit 
brought by disability cause lawyers has had broader implications for 
systemic change on behalf of people with disabilities than do the cases 
before the Court. While some of the cause lawyer cases were brought 
pursuant to the class action device, all have had systemic effects 
beyond the individuals involved. This circumstance exists in only a 
minority of cases brought before the Court by non-cause lawyers. 
This phenomenon is especially so in the context of the employment 
discrimination claims in which non-cause lawyers request accommo-
dations on behalf of individual clients.73 This trend might also explain 
why so many of the lawyers who chose to practice in this area litigated 
cases at the district court level that eventually were heard by the 
Court. 74 These cases stand in sharp contrast to the ones that have 
been litigated in the Supreme Court. 
I. Accessing the Internet: National Federation of the Blind v. Tar-
get - A coalition of disability rights advocates brought a class action 
suit against Target on behalf of the National Federation of the Blind 
and individual plaintiffs. They included a Berkeley-based nonprofit 
law firm that specializes in high-impact cases on behalf of people with 
disabilities; Brown, Goldstein & Levy, a leading civil rights law firm in 
Baltimore that often litigates disability access cases; Schneider & Wal-
lace, a national plaintiffs' class action and civil rights law firm based 
in San Francisco; and Peter Blanck, chairman of the Burton Blatt In-
stitute and University Professor at Syracuse University. 75 Under the 
settlement reached, Target agreed to make its website fully accessible 
and to pay substantial damages. 76 
2. Alternative Forms of Communication in Federal Government 
Services: American Council of the Blind v. Astrue. -Represented by 
the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF) in 
Berkeley, California, the American Council of the Blind and ten indi-
vidual plaintiffs brought a class action case to compel the Social Secu-
rity Administration to provide information in alternative formats like 
Braille, audio, large font, and electronic text to ensure that persons 
by these attorneys is highly unlikely to merit review at the Supreme Court, even as they garner 
negative attention through the media. 
73 See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Dispamte Impact, and Ckl.ss 
Actions, 56 DUKE L.]. 861 (2006). 
74 See Table 1, supra pp. 1671-72. 
75 See Nat'! Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d u8s (N.D. Cal. 2007); Nat'! 
Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
76 Class Settlement Agreement and Release at 3, s, Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 582 F. Supp. 2d 
1185 (No. C o6-o1802 MHP), available at http://www.dralegal.org/downloads/casesltarget/Final-
Agreement.pdf. 
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with visual disabilities can obtain benefits. 77 This case proceeded to a 
bench trial, and on October 20, 2009, the court issued a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff classes. 78 This case is one of several in which 
DREDF has sued federal government agencies and is not the first 
against the Social Security Administration. 79 
J. Physical Accessibility in Fast Food Restaurants: Moeller v. Taco 
Bell. - Plaintiffs with mobility impairments filed suit against Taco 
Bell, challenging physical accessibility barriers at California Taco Bell 
stores.8° Fox & Robertson, a private two-lawyer civil rights law firm 
in Denver with a specialization in disability law, brought this class ac-
tion along with the Impact Fund, a general public interest firm with 
an emphasis in high-profile class actions.81 Fox & Robertson is bring-
ing other cases challenging physical accessibility in the fast food indus-
try82 and other sectors.83 
4· Alternative Communication in Banking: Talking ATM Cases. -
Over the last several years, Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & 
Dardarian, a civil rights firm in Oakland, California, has, together 
with solo practitioner Lainey Feingold, engaged in "structured negotia-
tions" with a number of major banks on the part of the California 
Council for the Blind, as well as individuals and several other affiliates 
of the American Council of the Blind.84 Collectively, these cause law-
yers have negotiated agreements with Bank of America, Bank 
One/Chase, and Wells Fargo, among others, "to guarantee that persons 
with visual impairments have access to basic banking services that the 
sighted world takes for granted," including "talking ATMs" offering 
audible instructions to aid customers in their banking transactions.85 
77 See Am. Council of the Blind v. Astrue, No. C 05-o4696 WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. II, 2oo8), 
available at http://www.dredf.org/cases/SSA_Ciass_Cert_Order_9-l 2-o8.pdf (order certifying 
class). 
78 See Am. Council of the Blind v. Astrue, No. c os-04696 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2009) (judg-
ment). The plaintiff class won the right to receive communications in a format that is accessible 
to them. 
79 See Disability Rights Educ. & Def. Fund, State and Federal Programs, http:// 
www.dredf.org/programs/State_and_Federal.shtrnl (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
80 See Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., No. Co2-05849 MJJ, 2007 WL 2301778, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 8, 2007). 81 /d. at *1. 
82 See Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
83 See Pleadings: Fox & Robertson, P.C., http://www.foxrob.com/pleadings.asp (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2010). 
84 See Goldstein Demchak Baller Borgen & Dardarian, Bank One/Chase Talking ATMs, Web 
Access & Alternative Formats, http://www.gdblegal.com/cases/current_cases/Disability_Rights/ 
BANK_ONE_CHASE.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
85 /d. 
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Because of their industry-wide approach, these agreements have 
reached tens of thousands of banking locations across the country.86 
5· Discrimination in Voting: American Ass'n of People with Dis-
abilities v. Shelley. - The Disability Rights Education and Defense 
Fund, based in Berkeley, California, and the Disability Rights Legal 
Center, based in Los Angeles, California, represented registered voters 
with either visual or manual impairments in opposing the withdrawal 
of direct recording electronic voting machines enabling the voters to 
vote secretly and independently without assistance.87 Although the 
court denied the motion for preliminary injunction,88 the suit had im-
plications for thousands of voters. 
6. Right To Live in the Community: DAI v. Paterson. -Disability 
Advocates Inc., a P&A, brought this action on behalf of individuals 
with mental illness in New York City seeking to live in community-
based supported housing.89 The Bazelon Center, New York Lawyers 
for the Public Interest, MFY Legal Services, Urban Justice Center, and 
the law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison joined them.90 
The trial court held that these 4300 individuals were entitled to live in 
the most integrated settings appropriate to their needs.91 
7· Accessibility of City Sidewalks: Barden v. City of Sacramento. 
- Plaintiffs, a group of individuals with mobility and vision impair-
ments, filed a lawsuit against the City of Sacramento, alleging that the 
City violated the ADA by failing to install curb ramps in newly con-
structed or altered sidewalks and by failing to maintain existing side-
walks to ensure accessibility by persons with disabilities. The lawyers 
for plaintiffs were Disability Rights Advocates.92 At the district court, 
the City prevailed on its motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the argument 
that sidewalks were not a public program, service, or activity and 
therefore were not covered under Title TI of the ADA. Plaintiffs ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court.93 The 
case then settled, setting a nationwide precedent requiring cities and 
other public entities to make all public sidewalks accessible. The set-
tlement provided that for up to thirty years, the City of Sacramento 
86 See Goldstein Demchak Baller Borgen & Dardarian, Disability Rights, http://www. 
gdblegal.com/Practice_Areas/Disability_Rights.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
87 Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124-25 (C.D. Cal. 
2004). 
88 /d. at 1131-32. 
89 See Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
90 See Judge David L. Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Pa-
terson, http://www.bazelon.org/incourt/docketldai.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
9! Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 314. 
92 See Disability Rights Advocates, Barden v. Sacramento, http://www.dralegal.org/cases/ 
public_entitieslbarden_v_sacramento.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
93 See Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F. 3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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would allocate twenty percent of its annual transportation fund to 
make the city's pedestrian rights-of-way accessible to individuals with 
vision or mobility disabilities. This agreement included installation of 
compliant curb ramps at intersections, removal of barriers that ob-
struct sidewalks (including narrow pathways, abrupt changes in level, 
excessive cross slopes, and overhanging obstructions), and improve-
ments in crosswalk access.94 
Although the above represent only a sample of cases brought by 
disability cause lawyers, they are consistent with the overall trend of 
movement attorneys primarily advancing claims that have implica-
tions beyond the individual clients whose interests they are duty-
bound to represent.95 Moreover, to the extent that these cases arise 
from representing only particular types of disabilities, they are not ob-
jectionable to individuals with other forms of disabilities and do not 
raise the sort of tensions described throughout Law and Contradic-
tions. These differences arise because disability cause lawyers have 
gone to some lengths to craft remedies with the broadest possible im-
plications, rather than ones that only serve their clients. And to the 
extent that those remedies are disability-specific, the rulings also serve 
to establish precedent and lay the groundwork for future claims. 
IV. CAUSE LAWYERING WITHOUT THE SUPREME COURT 
Part ill demonstrated the absence of movement advocates from the 
design and argument of ADA cases eventually heard by the Supreme 
Court, a phenomenon unique to disability rights cause lawyering. This 
circumstance yields fertile ground from which to further engage Law 
and Contradictions and to consider the future direction of disability 
cause lawyering. The complete absence of Supreme Court cases 
brought by disability cause lawyers has created even more of a va-
cuum for the tensions identified by Bagenstos to flourish. Given the 
multiple goals embraced by the ADA, the various agendas put forward 
in its passage, and the fragmented nature of the disability communi-
94 See Disability Rights Advocates, supra note 92. 
95 This work continues in "real time." Stephanie Enyart, a law student sitting for the bar, was 
recently represented by Disability Rights Advocates in Berkeley in a successful lawsuit for the 
reasonable accommodation of a computer-assisted reading device on the bar exam. See Bob 
Egelko, Bar Exam Company Fights Computer Aid for Blind Student, S.F. CHRON., Feb. I 1, 2010, 
at C2. The American Council for the Blind, in connection with Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Bor-
gen & Dardarian and the Law Office of Lainey Feingold, recently entered into a structured nego-
tiation with Major League Baseball whereby Major League Baseball agreed to make its website 
and the websites of all thirty major league teams accessible for people who are blind or visually 
impaired. See Law Office of Lainey Feingold, MLB Accessible Website Press Release, http:!/ 
lflegal.comhoiO/oz/mlb-press Oast visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
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ty,96 these tensions may be inevitable. But the lack of a centralized 
movement agenda has removed Court decisions as an overt rallying 
point around which society could debate key disability rights prin-
ciples, at least in a way that disability cause lawyers might desire.97 
While highlighting tensions within the disability rights community, 
Bagenstos does offer the social movement of disability as the closest 
proxy to a unifying vision of the disability rights community and ex-
plains how this value is broadly expressed in the ADA (p. 18-20). We 
suspect that Bagenstos would agree that this fragile unity does not 
operate as a substitute for tactical decisions about how best to frame 
litigation efforts to the movement's advantage, a key role of cause 
lawyers. 
In the absence of such efforts, the numerous and uncoordinated 
strategies voiced by lawyers unconnected to the disability rights 
movement have proliferated the tensions and contradictions presented 
before the Supreme Court. While we agree with Bagenstos that the 
ADA is underenforced, cause lawyers have been at the forefront of en-
forcing the ADA's nonemployment provisions and serve as an example 
for what more robust public enforcement can aspire to achieve. We 
ultimately suggest that disability cause lawyers reengage key portions 
of the statute, in particular picking up some of the employment-driven 
issues that have been dominated by non-cause lawyers up to this 
point. As in past efforts, cause lawyers can and should continue their 
successes in seeking systemic reform at the district court level, using 
settlements to change the behavior of recalcitrant defendants. But we 
also suggest that in discrete instances, they should be more active in 
seeking Supreme Court adjudication. 
A. Cause Lawyering in the Lower Federal Courts 
The absence of Supreme Court cases brought by disability cause 
lawyers is not accidental. Nor is it readily attributable to the vagaries 
and unpredictability of the certiorari-granting process, or even a desire 
on the part of the Court to avoid cause lawyer cases. During its Octo-
ber 1999 Term, for example, the Court granted certiorari in two ADA 
cases: Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 98 and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kir-
96 See jOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIV-
IL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 41-73, 105-41 (1993); PaulK. Longmore, Disability Rights Movement, 
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN DISABILITY HISTORY 280, 285 (Susan Burch ed., 2009). 
97 We acknowledge that it would be inaccurate to portray cause lawyering efforts on behalf of 
any single movement as univocal. See generally RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); KENNETH W. MACK, RETHINKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERING AND 
POLITICS IN THE ERA BEFORE BROWN 19 (2005); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Move-
ments, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, ros COLUM. L. REv. 1436, 1455-66 (2005). 
98 525 U.S. ro63 (1999) (mem.). 
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kingburg.99 As discussed above, the lawyers for plaintiffs in these cas-
es were not disability cause lawyers. 100 In the same Term, the Court 
considered and denied petitions for certiorari in six other ADA cas-
es.101 In these six cases, none of the lawyers who represented the 
plaintiffs at the court of appeals or certiorari petition stage were disa-
bility cause lawyers. 102 Instead, the absence of disability cause lawyers 
is a function of the unique situation in which they find themselves un-
der the ADA. Although more work is needed to verify a complete lack 
of cause lawyer cases in the ADA certiorari pool, the dearth is not sur-
pnsmg. Using the sample of cause lawyer cases discussed above in 
section III.C, 103 the cases at the Supreme Court (and those that would 
have the best chance of getting there) were different in form and cha-
racter from the non-cause lawyer cases. Almost all of the cases ulti-
mately heard by the Court involved discrete questions of statutory in-
99 525 U.S. 1064 (1999) (mem.). 
100 The lawyers who filed the petition for certiorari in Sutton were Van Aaron Hughes and 
Thcker K. Trautman. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471 (1999) (No. 97-1943). Hughes is of counsel in the Denver office of Dorsey & Whitney. 
His areas of emphasis (as described on his firm's website) are commercial litigation, including ap-
pellate advocacy, contract disputes, securities fraud litigation, antitrust, and intellectual property 
litigation. See Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Van Aaron Hughes Attorney Profile, http://www.dorsey. 
com/hughes_aaron (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). Trautman practices in the areas of intellectual 
property litigation, complex commercial litigation, antitrust, securities fraud, and regulatory law. 
See Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Thcker K. Trautman Attorney Profile, http://www.dorsey.com/ 
trautman_tucker/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). The lawyer for the Sutton plaintiffs at the Tenth 
Circuit was Shawn D. Mitchell, a Colorado State legislator who keeps up a part-time law prac-
tice. See Colorado General Assembly, Shawn Mitchell, http://www.state.co.us/gov_dirlleg_dir/ 
senate/members/sen23.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). The lawyers for the Sutton plaintiffs at 
the District Court were Trautman and Mitchell. The lawyer for the plaintiff in Albertson's at the 
Ninth Circuit (and Supreme Court) was Scott Hunt, a partner in the three-lawyer firm of Busse & 
Hunt in Portland, Oregon. His practice is focused heavily on employment, and subsequent to Al-
bertson's, has come to include a significant portion of disability law. See Busse & Hunt, Scott N. 
Hunt, http://www.busseandhunt.com/Firm%2oinfo/Lawyersii5o4340.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 
2010). 
101 See Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 526 U.S. 1159 (1999), denying cert. to 157 F.3d 668 (9th 
Cir. 1998); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Griffith, 526 U.S. 1144 (1999), denying cert. to Griffith v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998); Seaborn v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 525 U.S. 1144 
(1999), denying cert. to 143 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998); Palm Beach Soil & Water Conservation 
Dist. v. Bledsoe, 525 U.S. 826 (1998), denying cert. to Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Soil & Water Con-
servation Dist., 133 F.3d 816 (uth Cir. 1998); Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels, 525 U.S. 821 
(1998), denying cert. to 137 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 1998); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 525 U.S. 819 (1998), 
denying cert. to 136 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1998). 
102 The lawyers who argued at the courts of appeals for these cases were as follows: John Emry 
(Coolbaugh, 136 F.3d at 431), David William White (Christopher, 137 F.3d 1069); Isidro M. Garcia 
(Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 817); Marie A. Mattox (Seaborn, 143 F.3d at 1406); Lee Hornberger (Griffith, 
135 F.3d at 377); and Suzanne Dohrer (Ferguson, 157 F.3d at 669). Although some of these law-
yers have employment and civil rights experience, none satisfy the definition of disability cause 
lawyers as set out in this Review. 
103 See supra pp. 1681-85. 
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terpretation. 104 In many ways, these were defensive cases: the plain-
tiffs tried to vindicate a statutory right (to be granted a reasonable ac-
commodation, to be treated equally in a privately owned place of pub-
lic accommodation, and so forth), and the defendant raised an issue of 
statutory interpretation as a defense. The fact that plaintiffs were in-
dividuals with "marginal" disabilities allowed the defendants to ma-
neuver at least on the definition of disability. 105 Of course, it is the re-
ality of litigation under a statute that anyone can (and should be able 
to) litigate a case all the way to the Supreme Court to vindicate an in-
dividual right. But the distinction that Law and Contradictions does 
not engage is that this reality is a far cry from cause lawyers using liti-
gation to express a key movement principle.106 
Consider that in bringing nonemployment enforcement actions, 
cause lawyers are attempting to achieve systemic justice at a level of 
generality with which most disability advocates would agree. 107 They 
are not trying to create new law, but rather to secure existing statutory 
rights for the largest population possible. Many cause lawyer cases in-
volve claims with individuals whose coverage under the ADA's defini-
tion of disability is beyond dispute. 108 One of the cases discussed 
above settled, 109 and the only case in which a party even sought a writ 
104 In Echazabal, for example, the question presented in the certiorari petition was "[w]hether a 
person who is unable to carry out the essential functions of a job without incurring significant 
risks to the person's own health or life is a 'qualified individual' who satisfies 'qualification stan-
dards' for that job within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act." Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at i, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (No. oo-1406). In Sutton, 
the questions presented in the certiorari petition were: "(r) Where an airline pilot's uncorrected 
vision is so poor that it constitutes a physical impairment under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, is the pilot nevertheless excluded from protection under the Act if her vision can be cor-
rected? (2) Should courts defer to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) In-
terpretive Guidance that disabilities should be analyzed in their uncorrected state? (3) Is a com-
mercial pilot regarded as disabled by a major airline that refuses to employ her as a pilot for that 
airline due to her poor vision?" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Sutton, 527 U.S. 471 (No. 97-
1943). 
105 See CAL. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2007 CALIFORNIA LABOR LAW DIGEST 8H>-I r 
(2007) (noting that in ADA cases, an employee will not be considered disabled in circumstances 
analogous to Sutton, Albertson's, and Murphy). 
106 "Cause lawyers, in short, are not simply carriers of a cause but are at the same time its pro-
ducers: those who shape it, name it, and voice it." Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinski, Destruction of 
Houses and Construction of a Cause: Lawyers and Bedouins in Israeli Courts, in POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS, supra note 17, at 227, 231. 
107 Even in the employment accommodation area, one may identify many issues that unite dis-
parate groups of people with different disabilities. The active participation of cause lawyers 
would greatly facilitate this dynamic. See generally Stein & Waterstone, supra note 73. 
108 In none of the cases discussed above in section lli.C, supra pp. r68r-85, was there a liti-
gated issue as to whether the plaintiffs in fact met the ADA definition of disability. 
109 In the talking ATM cases, the plaintiffs' attorneys do not routinely file lawsuits, but instead 
proceed under a theory of "structured negotiations." Interview by Paul Halpern with Linda M. 
Dardarian, Partner, Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian (Apr. 12, 2008), http:// 
www.lawyersandsettlements.cornlarticles/dardarian-structured-negotiation.html. National Feder-
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of certiorari was Barden v. City of Sacramento, 110 in which the peti-
tioners (unsuccessfully) sought Court adjudication. These lawsuits are 
essentially enforcement actions, with an eye toward changing behavior 
in a systemic fashion to impact the largest number of people. This 
practice is in sharp contrast to the more atomistic nature of most of the 
Supreme Court ADA cases. 
In one sense, by bringing cases with broad reach, the disability 
cause lawyers are following the institutional litigation traditions of 
their civil rights predecessors. 111 As a statute with ambitious goals but 
a modest remedial scheme, 112 the ADA is even more dependent than 
predecessor civil rights statutes on professional cause lawyers. Given 
developments in the private attorney payment scheme, 113 attorneys 
whose work is not externally financed may have trouble sustaining 
themselves, 114 and federal enforcement officials traditionally have not 
made structural litigation a priority.llS Rather than bringing high-
profile cases before the Supreme Court to change existing legal inter-
pretations and social perceptions (the traditional top-down tenet of 
movement lawyers), disability cause lawyers have engaged in the type 
of activity usually seen as the province of public enforcement agencies 
like the Department of Justice. 
That disability cause lawyers have utilized nontraditional cause 
lawyering tactics by foregoing the Supreme Court reflects their history. 
Whereas the NAACP-era cause lawyers had first to litigate to remove 
Jim Crow-era state laws, 116 women's rights groups dismantled socially 
ation of the Blind ultimately settled. Astrue and Disability Advocates v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 
2d I84 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), are still ongoing. 
110 292 F.3d I073 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
111 See Waterstone, supra note 21, at 455-57. 
112 See generally Ruth Colker, ADA Title Ill: A Fragile Compromise, 2I BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 377 (2ooo); Waterstone, supra note I r. 
113 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598 (2ooi) (holding that plaintiffs must achieve a material alteration of the legal relationship of 
the parties - such as a favorable judgment on the merits or a consent decree - to receive attor-
neys' fees); see also Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil 
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REv. 
I087 (2007) (discussing Buckhannon's negative effects on private organizations that bring civil 
rights cases). 
114 In one sense, the existence of private lawyers in Table 3, supra pp. 1679-SI, argues against 
this idea. But virtually none of these organizations does exclusively disability rights advocacy. 
The high-volume lawyers, who may focus more attention in that area, traditionally bring cases in 
states like California, whose laws contain a remedial scheme more robust than the ADA's. 
115 See Waterstone, supra note 2 I , at 45 7. · 
116 See ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 47, 48 (3d ed. 2005) ("Margold's 
[(Nathan Margold, the drafter of the NAACP's master plan)] plan was to move the Supreme 
Court toward the ultimate goal in small steps .... The first prong was directed at eliminating seg-
regation laws that did not require equality along with separation. The second prong was directed 
at eliminating segregation in states where the inequality was endemic and therefore discriminate-
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constructed rules that restricted workplace opportunities and sexual 
and reproductive freedoms,ll7 and the gay rights movement has put 
significant emphasis on changing prevailing interpretations of state 
and federal constitutions, 118 disability cause lawyers have faced a dif-
ferent social reality. Even before the ADA, several states had progres-
sive laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability in em-
ployment, public services, and private accommodations. 119 As 
Bagenstos demonstrates, and as others have recounted in more detail, 
disability cause lawyers built on this foundation and played a monu-
mental role in achieving passage of the ADA, 120 which arguably re-
mains the world's most progressive disability antidiscrimination legis-
lation.121 Those efforts, as well as earlier ones, 122 invested these 
lawyers in movement goals and endowed them with credibility. This 
legitimacy is not exclusive to cause lawyers. However, people with 
such dedication to this area (made up in part, we suspect, from their 
own experiences as people with disabilities or having family members 
ry.'); see also 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 830 (1964) (discussing the 
NAACP's shift "from legal defense to legal offense"). 
11 7 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding that overly restric-
tive regulation on maternity leave in public schools violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause mandates that administrators of estates be named in a way that does not discriminate 
between sexes); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law pro-
hibiting the use of contraceptives violated the right to marital privacy). 
118 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (unsuccessful constitutional challenge to 
Georgia sodomy statute); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (successful constitutional chal-
lenge to Texas sodomy statute); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (holding that same-
sex couples have an equal right to marry under California's Equal Protection Clause, superseded 
by constitutional amendment, CAL. CON ST. art. I, § 7.5 ("Only marriage between a man and a 
woman is valid or recognized in California. 'l 
119 See PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY 734-37 (2d 
ed. 2009). 
120 See Ziv, supra note 17. 
121 See 137 CONG. REC. 19,530 (1991) (statement of Sen. Simon) ("[T]he United States had, by 
virtue of enacting the ADA, become the world leader in establishing rights and opportunities for 
persons with disabilities .... [O]ther countries are looking to us for leadership.'~; President George 
H.W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1067, 1068 Guly 26, 1990) (stating that the ADA "is the world's first comprehensive declaration of 
equality for people with disabilities" and "has made the United States the international leader on 
this human rights issue'). 
122 Perhaps the seminal litigation campaign for the rights of people with disabilities was a sus-
tained challenge to the deplorable conditions in Bryce Hospital, a state institution in Alabama, in 
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 
(M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub 
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). On the role of cause lawyers in the Wyatt 
campaign, see L. RALPH }ONES & RICHARD R. PARLOUR, WYAIT V. STICKNEY: RETROSPECT 
AND PROSPECT (1981). On pre-ADA disability cause lawyering, see SUSAN M. OLSON, 
CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984). 
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with disabilities) have especial insight into the lived experiences of 
people with disabilities that may not extend beyond that community. 123 
Instead of charging constitutional windmills - a dubious prospect 
after the 1985 Supreme Court decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc. 124 declared rational basis as the Equal Protection 
Clause standard of review for disability discrimination 125 - cause 
lawyers have naturally tended to focus on enforcing existing statutory 
rights. In trying to achieve the greatest good for the largest number of 
people, it is understandable that disability cause lawyers have tended 
to focus their efforts on cases outside the employment realm, where 
they stand the greatest chance of success at the district court level and 
can avoid federal court skittishness at aggregating plaintiff interests 
within the employment relationship. 126 Disability cause lawyers pri-
marily exist in a post-"Hollow Hope"127 world, where there is healthy 
skepticism about using the Supreme Court as a tool to change the 
lived experiences of a targeted group. These movement lawyers also 
have been savvy enough to engage a legal mobilization framework, 128 
where litigation functions as a bargaining chip in negotiations, rather 
than as an end to be achieved. By directly controlling settlement 
terms, these advocates have avoided relying on the judiciary for en-
forcement that courts are institutionally ill-equipped and indisposed to 
handle. This situation is compounded by disability cause lawyers' be-
ing in the unique civil rights position of needing to enforce an existing 
statute rather than the more historical one of needing the Court to 
break down existing barriers using constitutional means. This vision 
of the disability rights movement - to enforce existing nonemploy-
ment rights through district court litigation by settling most cases 
along the way- is an omission from Law and Contradictions's excep-
tionally thoughtful account of the interaction between the disability 
rights movement and the legal landscape. Neglecting the cause law-
yers also elides the harder question of how the Court's ADA jurispru-
dence might have evolved in response to the type of unified disability 
rights movement for which Bagenstos wisely advocates. 
123 See generally ]AMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT Us: DISABILITY 
OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT (1998). 
124 473 U.S. 432 (r985). 
125 I d. at 441-42. 
126 See Waterstone, supra note 1 r (noting greater litigation successes in Title IT and Title Ill 
cases); see also Stein & Waterstone, supra note 73, at 903-<>4 (discussing failures of Title I cases 
but successes in Title II and Title Ill in pursing collective remedies). 
127 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (rst ed. 1991). 
128 For a general discussion of legal mobilization, see MICHAEL W. McCANN, RIGHTS AT 
WORK (1994). 
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B. Impact of Absence of Cause Lawyer Cases 
from the Supreme Court 
[Vol. 123:I658 
Amicus briefs and the kind of defensive maneuvering used in Ha-
son129 are at the margins. Real control over a case resides in the law-
yers who decide to bring it in the first place and who ultimately con-
trol whether and how the case will proceed. Disability rights cause 
lawyers have largely been absent from these key decisions. This ab-
sence has had important consequences for both the cases that have 
been brought and the manner in which they have been portrayed. 
Consider, for example, the nature of the claimant's disability. One 
aspect of Supreme Court ADA litigation that has undercut the goals of 
the disability rights movement - and differentiated it from prior 
cause-oriented movements and their attorneys 130 - is the unsympa-
thetic nature of the clients and fact patterns that appeared before the 
Court. 131 Given the lack of involvement by disability rights cause 
lawyers in Court cases - beginning with the district court trials - it 
is perhaps unsurprising that many of these cases did not involve indi-
viduals and circumstances that advocates would have hoped for in the 
first round of ADA litigation.132 
This was especially salient in the employment cases in which the 
plaintiffs' alleged disabilities combined with their allegations of dis-
crimination created discomfort for judges and provided ready fodder 
for lampoon and scorn in the popular media. 133 For example, Sutton 
129 See Hasan v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d u67 (9th Cir. 2002); see also supra pp. 1676-77. 
!30 See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of Three High 
Profile Government Lawsuits, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 457, 489 (2009) ("The NAACP lawyers re-
cruited plaintiffs for their cases based on the parties' ability best to represent the legal claims the 
lawyers sought to advance.'); see also Barclay & Marshall, supra note 18, at 194 (describing plain-
tiffs in Vermont gay marriage litigation, who were in "committed relationships, [] were financially 
secure, [and] were respected members of their communities 'living quiet lives"' (citations omit-
ted)); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between: Clarifying Organizational Posi-
tionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 5 II, 519 
(2003) ("For instance, if the judiciary proves sympathetic to a particular gay identity - e.g., ho-
mosexual as respectable family member - advocates will use such identity to obtain desirable 
results and to meet client needs.'). But see BROOKS ET AL., supra note n6, at 48 (describing the 
NAACP's early case of Hocutt v. Wilson, Civ. No. 1-188 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 1933), where 
NAACP lawyers discovered on cross-examination that their client was not qualified for admission 
into pharmacy school). 
131 See, e.g., Michael D. Reisman, Traveling "To the Farthest Reaches of the ADA," or Taking 
Aim at Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Perceived Disability?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2121, 2143-44 (2005) (discussing the nearsighted pilot plaintiffs in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), as unsympathetic). 
132 Cf Soifer, Disabling the ADA, supra note 56, at 1289-90 (criticizing ·swing voters on the 
Court for employing a "stealth strategy," id. at 1290, when selecting ADA cases). 
133 See generally Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler's Despair: The 
Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 223 (2000). 
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v. United Air Lines, Inc. 134 involved twin plaintiffs with severe myo-
pia who sought accommodations as airline pilots. 135 This situation 
created problems from the outset. In addition to the general question 
of weighing disability rights against public safety, 136 the question of 
whether everyone with corrective lenses should benefit from civil 
rights protection initiated fears that litigation floodgates would open 
and drown federal dockets. 137 Similarly, Toyota Motor Manufacturing 
v. Williams 138 and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 139 involved 
claims by individuals with what some might consider marginal disabil-
ities (carpal tunnel syndrome and high blood pressure, respectively), 
which fed into fears that the ADA could become a runaway statute if 
not vigorously policed. 140 At a very early stage, these concerns placed 
the definition of disability at the center of attention, and the resulting 
narrowing interpretations - although drawn from outlier fact patterns 
-set the stage for the next decade of ADA litigation. 141 
The absence of Supreme Court cases brought by disability cause 
lawyers has created an odd vacuum. Although a full appraisal of the 
ADA requires in-depth examination of more than Supreme Court deci-
sions, these cases cast a long shadow in terms of doctrinal impact, in-
fluence on public opinion, and symbolism. 142 For better or worse, Su-
134 527 U.S. 471. 
135 I d. at 475. 
136 See, e.g., Walter Olson, Disabling America, NAT'L REv., May 5, 1997, at 40 (noting that 
ADA lawsuits are on a collision course with public safety). 
137 At the oral argument in Sutton, Justice Scalia waved his glasses in the air, noting that under 
the plaintiffs' preferred definition of the statute, seven out of nine Supreme Court Justices could 
count as protected class members, as could a majority of Americans. See Walter Olson, Under the 
ADA, We May All Be Disabled, WALL ST.]., May 17, 1999, at A27. The issue of eyeglasses and 
disability was resolved by a specific provision in the ADA Amendments Act expressly excluding 
this population. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 
3556 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. II 2oo8); 42 U.S.C. § 12103 (Supp. II 2008)). 
138 534 u.s. 184 (2002). 
139 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
140 See generally Ruth E. Sternglantz, Raining on the Parade of Horribles: Of Slippery Slopes, 
Faux Slopes, and Justice Scalia's Dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 
(2005) (describing and critiquing the "slippery slope" argument in which judges "highlight[] the 
dire effects of proximately potential future decisions that are likely to result from the present 
case"). 
141 See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability Dis-
crimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 
42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 539 (1997) ("The restrictions on the term 'disability,' imposed in the name 
of reserving the protection of the statute for 'the truly disabled,' have caught many plaintiffs with 
serious, highly disabling conditions in their webs.'). 
142 For treatments of the civil rights movement expressed through the lens of important Su-
preme Court cases, see, for example, GILLES & GOLUBOFF, supra note 45; ]OHN R. HOWARD, 
THE SHIFTING WIND: THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL RIGHTS FROM RECONSTRUC-
TION TO BROWN (1999); MICHAEL]. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2007); MICHAEL]. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS (2004); and TUSHNET, supra note 4 I. 
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preme Court cases also drive academic discussion. There is a tendency 
in academic circles to "romance the Court"143 and to describe law and 
social movements through the prism of Supreme Court adjudication. 
This situation has played out in the context of the ADA, where much 
ink has been spilled over the Court's definition-of-disability deci-
sions.144 The thrust of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 was to "cor-
rect'' these decisions. 145 To his credit, Bagenstos takes a broader ap-
proach and derives the themes and tensions of disability rights thought 
from a broad range of sources and scholarship (pp. 12-33). But many 
of the important conflicts identified by Law and Contradictions as in-
herent to the disability rights movement have been exacerbated by the 
lack of a unifying agenda provided by cause lawyers at the Supreme 
Court. Put another way, the hodgepodge of advocacy advanced by 
non-cause lawyers on behalf of their individual clients seeking indi-
vidual remedies has highlighted prior tensions and contradictions. 
Before the disability rights movement centered around the ADA, 
Supreme Court litigation was a focal point to articulate key values of 
other civil rights movements. In the desegregation campaign, cause 
lawyers intentionally maneuvered the claim of "separate but equal" as 
inherently unequal before the Court. Women's cause lawyers devel-
oped protection for sexual and reproductive freedom through constitu-
tional privacy protection by arguing landmark cases such as Griswold 
v. Connecticut1 46 and Roe v. Wade. 147 In the gay rights movement, al-
though advocates have resisted the temptation to put the issue of mar-
riage equality before the United States Supreme Court (while doing so 
in numerous state supreme courts), 148 there has been confluence and 
coordination on the right to privacy and liberty in sexual relations re-
sulting in its decriminalization by the Court in Lawrence. 149 The con-
143 See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. REV. 563, 564 (2009) ("If scho-
lars want to understand the capacity of the Justices to influence democratic deliberation, they 
need to focus on that deliberation and on social movements, not on the Court. Focusing only on 
the Court will inevitably overstate its role .... [W]hy, in the face of decades of social science re-
search, [do]legal academics continue their endless quest to find judicial influence, to romance the 
Court[?]"). For an example of scholarship moving beyond a Court-centered approach to address 
social change, see McCANN, supra note 128. 
144 See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 141; ChaiR. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Fed-
eral Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2ooo); Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Re-
garded As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REv. 587 (1997); Soifer, Dis-
abling the ADA, supra note 56; Soifer, The Disability Term, supra note 56. 
145 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. II0-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
146 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
147 410 u.s. Il3 (1973). 
148 See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. 
Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1501--o4 (2006). 
149 See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 1639-40. 
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elusion is subtle: Contemporary cause lawyers need not control their 
respective movements as they did in previous waves of civil rights liti-
gation. However, their involvement in bringing and litigating cases up 
to the Supreme Court has been a unifying force for prior movements 
in identifying core values, and such a contribution remains a necessary 
and missing ingredient for disability rights advocacy. Indeed, this 
harmonizing dynamic is exactly what Bagenstos identifies as the miss-
ing feature necessary for the future success of the American disability 
rights movement. 
To be sure, even without the direct involvement of cause lawyers, a 
minority of the Supreme Court's ADA cases have raised key move-
ment values. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,I 50 for example, should 
appropriately be viewed as the struggle of the disability rights com-
munity to be free from paternalistic views of what is deemed best for 
their welfare. 151 Similarly, the right to live in the community instead 
of in an institution, at issue in Olmstead v. L.C., 152 is a fundamental 
and longstanding principle of the disability movementl 53 about which 
the movement's cause lawyers sought Court hearings. 154 But other 
cases are notable for the extent to which they only peripherally address 
important movement values. For example, both the underlying claims 
in Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. ISS (lack of physical access on 
cruise ships and disability-related surcharges156) and the legal issue be-
fore the Supreme Court (extraterritorial reach of the ADA) are oblique 
to the lived experiences and concerns of most Americans with disabili-
ties. Three of the more prominent Supreme Court ADA cases -
ISO 536 U.S. 73 (2002). 
151 This argument is raised and analogized to the parallel struggle of women to be free of pa-
ternalistic assumptions as expressed in Johnson Controls. See Anita Silvers et aL, Disability and 
Employment Discrimination at the Rehnquist Court, 75 Miss. L.}. 945 (2006). What is deeply 
ironic and disturbing in Echazabal is the insistence by the Court that the clearly paternalistic rul-
ing is not the type of paternalism the ADA seeks to combat See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 85-86, 85 
n.5-
152 527 u.s. 581 (1999). 
153 See generally INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE (Nancy M. 
Crewe & Irving Kenneth Zola eds., 1983); DUANE F. STROMAN, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (2003); University of California, Berkeley, The Disability Rights and Independent 
Living Movement, http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/collections/drilm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
154 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding as con-
stitutionally invalid a local zoning ordinance that had the effect of prohibiting mentally retarded 
individuals from living in the community). Other Court cases also went to the issue of conditions 
within institutions. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. r (1981). Cause lawyer David Ferleger was involved in several of 
these cases. See David Ferleger: Attorney, http://www.ferleger.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
155 545 U.S. Il9 (2005). 
156 Among other claims, plaintiffs alleged that because only four cabins in each ship were ADA 
accessible, potential passengers with disabilities were not allowed to participate in advance pur-
chase discount programs and were thereby assessed surcharges. Complaint, Spector v. Norwe-
gian Cruise Line Ltd., No. H-oo-2649 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2000). 
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Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,t57 Tennessee 
v. Lane, 158 and United States v. Georgia159 - had at their core legal 
issues that were part of a larger federalism project undertaken by the 
Rehnquist Court. 160 These cases clearly involved important disability 
rights issues: the right to be treated equally by the state in publicly run 
programs, services, and activities. The advocates who argued these 
cases, particularly at the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, 
were talented and had significant civil rights experience. 161 They were 
aware that larger disability rights issues existed in these cases, and 
they made use of these issues in their arguments. 162 But that is a dif-
ferent project than having cause lawyers engineer cases from the 
ground up to establish and extend the scope of ADA coverage. 
Further, when Law and Contradictions highlights conflicts within 
positions held by various members of the disability rights movement 
that are reflected in the menagerie of Supreme Court ADA cases, it 
does so with the benefit of hindsight. For although Bagenstos adroitly 
aligns precepts within the Court's decisions with disability rights 
movement tensions - and wisely counsels for reconciliation of those 
disagreements - without cause lawyers and in the absence of different 
strands of disability rights presented before the Court, the occasional 
presence of core precepts must be viewed as serendipitous, rather than 
as reflecting an active choice from among conflicting values. This is 
not to say that opposing themes would not exist without being fully 
vetted by cause lawyers at the Supreme Court. Bagenstos demon-
strates to the contrary in Law and Contradictions and has himself or-
chestrated and argued two core cases: Lane, which raised the issue of 
courthouse access by two wheelchair users,163 and Echazabal, which 
challenged a paternalistic exclusion from work of an individual with a 
liver condition. 164 But one is left to wonder how different the Rehn-
quist Court's ADA jurisprudence would have been had cause lawyers 
led a unified movement in bringing cases before the Supreme Court. 
157 53 I u.s. 356 (200I). 
158 54 I u.s. 509 (2004). 
159 546 u.s. IS I (2006). 
160 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, III YALE L.]. II41 (2002). 
161 Among these advocates were Professors Bagenstos, Pamela Karlan, and Michael 
Gottesman. 
162 See generally Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an Eccentric 
Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31 (2001); Brief for the Private Respondents at 7, UJne, S4I U.S. 509 
(No. 02-1667), 2003 WL 22428029 at *7 ("Title II operate[s] broadly to protect individuals with 
disabilities against being effectively shut out of opportunities to have access to and influence on 
their state governments.'). 
163 Lane, 541 U.S. at 513. 
164 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002). 
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Such an effort would have required exactly the type of reconciliation 
and strategic thinking shrewdly advocated by Law and Contradictions. 
V. LOOKING AHEAD 
We have demonstrated how the nontraditional role of cause law-
yers, while effective in helping enforce the nonemployment provisions 
of the ADA, has created space for the tensions identified in Law and 
Contradictions to flourish. Although our project of examining and 
critiquing disability cause lawyers is ongoing, the interaction of cause 
lawyers' efforts to date with Bagenstos's thesis provides some initial 
insights into what cause lawyers might consider when moving 
forward. 
Happily, we may be on the threshold of an exciting time in disabili-
ty cause lawyering, and Bagenstos may be in a position to help usher 
in this new era. With the Obama Administration, we now have a 
President and an Attorney General who view civil rights as a top 
priority. 165 As part of this agenda, the President has appointed a 
number of well-informed activists to high-level Justice Department po-
sitions, including Bagenstos. Many of the Administration's appointees 
to key federal enforcement positions have a track record of disability 
advocacy and are on (at least the academic) record as arguing for more 
vigorous enforcement.166 Building on the successes cause lawyers have 
had in enforcing the nonemployment provisions of the ADA, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Justice Depart-
ment are already showing more leadership on these issues. 167 
In addition to partnering with public enforcement officials, cause 
lawyers should reclaim parts of Title I of the ADA by exerting more 
control over litigation and its messaging. We believe that disability 
cause lawyers, by building on their initial successes, can reinvigorate 
the ADA's antidiscrimination agenda, which is at least as important as 
moving toward universalist extrastatutory measures. Given the ADA's 
reliance on private enforcement, it is extremely unlikely that cause 
165 Charlie Savage, Justice Department To Recharge Civil Rights Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 2009, at AI (quoting Attorney General Holder's statement that the civil rights division 
will be "getting back to doing what it has traditionally done''). 
166 Bagenstos is one of these officials. See Samuel Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and the 
Enforcement of Civil Rights, 101 NW. U. L. REv. 1459, 146o-62 (2007) (noting shortcomings of the 
private attorney general model of enforcing civil rights). Chai Feldblum, one of the architects of 
the ADA, has been nominated as an EEOC Commissioner. Feldblum has been a consistent advo-
cate of meaningful enforcement of that statute. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 144. 
167 The EEOC recently announced that it had settled a class action case against Sears, Roe-
buck and Co. for $6.2 million. This is the EEOC's largest ADA settlement to date. See Press Re-
lease, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Sears, Roebuck To Pay $6.2 Million for 
Disability Bias (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://archive.eeoc.gov/press/9-29-o9.htrnl. 
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lawyers can control the Court's docket. No group m any movement 
can.r6s 
Moreover, the type of control over litigation strategy exerted by 
cause lawyers in other movements has its own problems and is contro-
versial. Contrary to the image often portrayed in early accounts of the 
years leading up to Brown v. Board of Education, there was substan-
tial dissent within the black community as to what the objectives of 
any campaign to overthrow American apartheid ought to be and how 
best to achieve them. 169 There were also blacks who benefited from 
certain aspects of segregation or who opposed racial mixing. By exert-
ing control (sometimes brutally) over the cases that would be brought 
to challenge "separate but equal," over the arguments advanced in 
those cases, and over how the overall struggle was presented to and 
understood by both the black community and the public at large, 
Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall, and the other lawyers 
affiliated with the NAACP were able to manage these internal tensions 
(albeit often with great difficulty) to present a coherent litigation strat-
egy in the period leading up to and for many years after Brown. 170 Al-
though many scholars now legitimately question some of the implica-
tions of allowing one group to so dominate the debate over racial 
equality, few argue that the black equality movement would have been 
better off without the work of this dedicated band of cause lawyers171 
or that the overarching litigation mission was not successful. 172 These 
black cause lawyers were able successfully to establish a coherent step-
by-step litigation strategy that papered over and ultimately tran-
scended these differences by persuading the overwhelming majority of 
blacks- and a large enough number of whites- to support their ba-
sic antidiscrimination and integrationist agenda. 173 
168 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (challenging the constitu-
tionality of California's Proposition 8). This case has garnered attention for its high-profile legal 
team of Theodore Olson and David Boies, two politically opposed lawyers who joined forces in 
support of gay marriage expressly for the purpose of placing the issue before the United States 
Supreme Court. See Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join To Fight Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 2009, at Ar. Neither of these lawyers has a history with the gay rights move-
ment that would suggest they are viewed as cause lawyers for that group's civil rights. 
169 See MARK V. TUSH NET, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1995); see also MACK, supra 
note 97. 
170 See generally TUSHNET, supra note 41. 
171 For a selection of scholarship critical of the NAACP, see DERRICK A. BELL, SILENT CO-
VENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION A:--ID THE U:--IFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL 
REFORM (2004); GOLUBOFF, supra note 97; and Brown-Nagin, supra note 97. Of these three 
critics, Professor Bell is arguably the only one to claim that black Americans would have been 
better off without Brown. See Derrick A. Bell, Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185 Gack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
liZ See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE (2003). 
173 See ]VA:--1 WILLIAMS, EYES 0:--1 THE PRIZE (1987). 
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As we discussed above, given political realities, the decisions of 
cause lawyers not to focus on a Supreme Court litigation strategy are 
defensible, and their success should be applauded. But there are still 
areas of the statute where the right case or cases brought with an eye 
toward the Supreme Court could be useful. Even if the Supreme 
Court would not readily do much to help the disability movement, it 
can continue to harm it doctrinally as well as contribute to an increa-
singly negative popular vision of disability rights. We suggest that 
disability cause lawyers have a role in reinvigorating the ADA's antidi-
scrimination potential - specifically, by reframing the existing and 
atomistic vision of what comprises reasonable accommodation, and fo-
cusing on employment failure-to-hire cases. This agenda might ulti-
mately involve engaging the Court and nudging it slowly toward a dif-
ferent vision of disability rights under the ADA. 174 
As discussed above, most "harmful" ADA precedents - and those 
to which Bagenstos has devoted most discussion in Law and Contra-
dictions - center on the ADA's employment provisions. 175 Under-
standing the central role that reasonable workplace accommodations 
play in fostering independence, social integration, and agency, disabili-
ty cause lawyers might have sculpted a reasonable accommodation 
case into one with systemic impact for the entire movement. In Law 
and Contradictions, Bagenstos offers a deeply nuanced view of the 
theoretical underpinnings and normative defensiveness of the concept 
of reasonable accommodation (pp. ro-rz). But cause lawyers are 
faced with a more immediate and tangible issue: what does "reasona-
ble accommodation" mean under the terms of the statute? The terrain 
here is relatively open: despite efforts made during the ADA's pas-
sage,176 Title I of the ADA itself contains no precise definition of "rea-
sonable accommodation," but instead gives general principles and illu-
strative examples. 177 The one Supreme Court case touching on this 
issue in the employment context, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,l 78 had 
174 On whether the Supreme Court's ADA docket was "inevitable," see Michael Selmi, Inter-
preting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and 
Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 CEo. WASH. L. REV. 522, 575 (2008). 
175 Bagenstos is not alone here in focusing on Title I. It has driven the ADA academic discus-
sion. See Waterstone, supra note u, at I811-I2. 
176 See BLANCK ET AL., supra note I I 9, at 6o-63 (discussing objections to the ADA, including 
problems with the "open-ended nature of the ADA's central terms," id. at 62). 
177 The statutory definition is: "The term 'reasonable accommodation' may include- (A) mak-
ing existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with dis-
abilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a va-
cant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or 
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or 
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. 
§ I211I(9) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
178 535 U.S. 39I (2002). 
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several disadvantages from the outset. It dealt with a request for a 
variance from an established seniority policy - a tough hurdle for 
the Court to overcome - and had a plaintiff with a back injury, no 
doubt viewed by many as a common injury and at most a marginal 
disability. 1 79 
Several cases raising this issue (not brought by cause lawyers) were 
denied certiorari. In McAlindin v. County of San Diego,180 the plain-
tiff, an individual with anxiety disorders (including panic disorder and 
somatoform disorders), requested the reasonable accommodation of a 
job transfer. He asserted he would benefit from and was entitled to 
this transfer, 181 and indeed similarly situated employees without dis-
abilities had been given transfers of this nature. 182 The defendant de-
clined. Similarly, in Sheren v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 183 the plaintiff, a 
sales associate hired in a furniture department, had a degenerative eye 
condition that led to declining vision. She requested that, as a reason-
able accommodation, her employer install a stationary high-powered 
magnifying machine that would allow her to continue her work. 
While conceding that the plaintiff's performance had been at least av-
erage, the defendant declined to make the accommodation. 
Given the idiosyncratic nature of ADA jurisprudence, leadership by 
cause lawyers on this issue might still be possible. Almost two decades 
after the passage of the ADA, most of its jurisprudence (certainly in 
the employment area) has been dominated by cases interpreting its de-
finition of disability. Apart from Barnett, there are no employment 
cases defining the contours of reasonable accommodation despite the 
lack of clear statutory guidance. With the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008, Congress has sent a clear signal to the courts that it is time to 
move past this narrow issue. 184 The moment is ripe for disability 
cause lawyers to identify a plaintiff with an unquestionable disability 
(say a blind individual) who sought a fairly uncontroversial accommo-
dation (say, a screen magnifier) whose cost would not satisfy the crite-
ria for an undue hardship defense under the ADA. Placing this type of 
plaintiff before the Court would force the Court to define the scope 
179 See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, US Airways v. Barnett and the Limits of Disability Ac-
commodation, in GILLES & GOLUBOFF, supra note 45, at 323. 
180 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999). 
181 /d. at I23D--3I. 
182 I d. at 12 36-38. 
183 No. 98-3166, 1999 WL 98046 (7th Cir. Feb. 18, 1999). 
184 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. uo-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 ("The 
purposes of this Act are ... to convey congressional intent that ... the primary object of attention 
in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have com-
plied with their obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an individual's impair-
ment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis."). 
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and content of a reasonable accommodation. 185 Such jurisprudence 
would also have great reach, as international law has increasingly 
adopted the reasonable accommodation mandate, but has yet to in-
terpret it. 186 
Another project might involve failure-to-hire cases - the hardest 
employment cases to bring and to prosecute, in large part because bias 
and discrimination at the hiring stage are more difficult to establish. 187 
Employment testing can be useful here, as it has been in other areas, 
to ferret out difficult-to-detect discrimination. 188 But because the 
damages in failure-to-hire cases are lower, and because testing is ex-
pensive, private lawyers have not typically utilized testing. Bagenstos 
suggests that public enforcement officials should do so (p. 135). This 
change would be a welcome development, and one for which one of 
the authors here has previously advocated. 189 
But using testing in failure-to-hire cases should not be so easily left 
to public officials. As detailed herein, disability cause lawyers have 
shown themselves to be resourceful and tenacious in enforcing the 
nonemployment provisions of the ADA. If they were to dedicate some 
of their efforts to bringing testing cases, it could yield benefits in 
changing the tone of ADA employment litigation, which has been 
dominated by individualized requests for reasonable accommodation 
and thoroughly sidetracked by definitional issues. Although these cas-
es might not contain legal issues that would warrant Supreme Court 
attention, they could publicly document what knowledgeable observers 
suspect is sadly prevalent: driven by bias and stigma, employers - ei-
ther consciously or unconsciously - are less likely to hire workers 
185 For an exhaustive account, see Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability 
Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79 (2003). 
186 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 6r1Io6, supra note 27; Council Directive 2000/78, Establishing a General 
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 0.]. (L 303) r6 (EC}. See 
generally Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Accessing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in EQUALITY AND ECONOMIC, So-
CIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Malcolm Langford & Eibe Reidel eds., 2010). 
187 This is true across civil rights statutes, but is even more amplified under the ADA. See Ste-
ven L. Willborn, The Nonevolution of Enforcement Under the ADA: Discharge Cases and the Hir-
ing Problem, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
103, ro3-o4 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) ("[O]ver the short life of the ADA, the ratio of dis-
charge to hiring cases has been about ro to r, a ratio that is substantially higher than for Title Vll 
cases ... .'). 
188 See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and 
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1401, 1426 (1998} ("[T]esting has proved to be an effective means 
of documenting discrimination:'); see also Michael ]. Yelnowsky, Filling an Enforcement Void: 
Using Testers To Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level 
Jobs, 26 U. MICH. ].L. REFORM 403, 413 (1993) ("Testing can help root out discriminatory prac-
tices where the disincentives to bring a private suit result in underenforcement. "). 
189 See Waterstone, supra note 21, at 471-74· 
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with disabilities. 190 Disability cause lawyer leadership on this issue 
could offer an example to similar struggles of other minority groups, 
who continue to be subject to stigma and bias at the hiring stage.191 It 
could also offer a very powerful display of a type of discrimination 
some forces believe no longer exists. 
These are steps cause lawyers can and should take to work within 
the antidiscrimination framework the ADA sets forth. In doing so, it is 
our hope that cause lawyers can reclaim the capacity of law to create 
social change, 192 a goal that we share with Bagenstos. While we also 
find ourselves agreeing with many of the extrastatutory reforms Ba-
genstos proposes, including public health insurance, we are wary of the 
disability community placing too many eggs in the universalist basket. 
As evidenced by the problems many people with disabilities face under 
the current iteration of "general" social programs,193 it is unlikely that 
any project, like health care programs, would be tailored to completely 
address the unique needs of people with disabilities. As Bagenstos ac-
knowledges, there is much still to be gained through a reinvigorated 
enforcement and even expansion of existing antidiscrimination prin-
ciples embodied in the ADA. 
190 The 2004 National Organization on Disability/Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities 
found, as in previous years, that the most prevalent form of discrimination against people with 
disabilities in employment is not being offered a job for which one is qualified. The second most 
common is being refused a job interview on the basis of disability. See NAT'L ORG. ON DISA-
BILITY, 2004 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 7 (2004). This 
statistic is not limited to service sector jobs: the State Bar of California's Committee on Legal Pro-
fessionals with Disabilities reported that nearly half of the respondents it surveyed believed that 
they were denied employment opportunities because of their disabilities. AM. BAR ASS'N 
COMM'N ON MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE·ON 
THE EMPLOYMENT OF LAWYERS WITH DISABILITIES 10-1 I (2006), available at http://www. 
abanet.org/disability/docs/conf_report_final.pdf. 
191 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. 
REv. 991 (2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873 (finding that simply having an 
African American-sounding name significantly decreased one's opportunity to receive a job in-
terview, regardless of occupation or industry). 
192 See Christopher W. Schmidt, "Freedom Comes Only from the Law": The Debate over Law's 
Capacity and the Making of Brown v. Board of Education, 2008 UTAH L. REV. I493 (arguing that 
legal reform helped make possible the change in prejudicial attitudes and customs during the civil 
rights era). On the need for a contextualized strategy to create social change, utilizing both legal 
and extralegal measures, see Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism, I20 HARV. L. REV. 
937, 987 (2007). 
193 See Michael E. Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Policy, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. I08I (2010) (discussing work disincentives for people with disabilities under existing federal 
programs); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. I, 26 
(2004). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Law and Contradictions is a deeply thoughtful contribution to dis-
ability law and policy jurisprudence, as befits the work of one of its 
leading scholars. The diagnoses and prescriptions offered by Bagens-
tos, untethered to any disability rights party line or trope, are in-
sightful and convincing. This Review, while agreeing with most of the 
assertions in Law and Contradictions, also engages an area almost 
wholly absent from the book as well as the general literature: the role 
of disability cause lawyers. These lawyers exist, and their unacknow-
ledged efforts may provide an opportunity for these advocates, the 
disability rights movement, and the wider civil rights and cause law-
yering communities to contribute to one another. 
